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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant-Appellant Lisa M. Brown ("Appellant" or "Ms. Brown") appeals from
certain orders and judgments entered by the Third Judicial District Court in favor of
Plaintiff-Appellee South Ridge Homeowner's Association ("Appellee" or the "HOA").
Specifically, Ms. Brown appeals the September 2, 2008 Order and Judgment and the
September 22, 2008 Judgment entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Summit
County.1 The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This appeal raises three primary issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment against Ms. Brown on Appellee's claim for breach of
contract based upon (a) its ruling that Article X, Section 2(a) of the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for South Ridge Subdivision (the "CC&Rs") was
unambiguous as a matter of law; and (b) its interpretation of Article X, Section 2(a) of the
CC&Rs to mean that a member of the South Ridge Subdivision is not permitted to rent
his or her property for any period of less than thirty (30) days; (2) whether the trial court
erred by entering permanent injunctive relief against Appellant in the absence of any
threat of continuing harm, and by ordering her to provide one-week advance written
notice to the HOA of any visitors to Appellant's residence, with the names of each family
member or friend who will be using Appellant's residence and the expected dates of use;

Copies of these orders are attached as Exhibits A and B to the Addendum hereto.
1

and (3) if the trial court's entry of summary judgment is reversed, whether the trial court
erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to Appellee.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
"considering the record as a whole, with no deference afforded to the legal conclusions of
the district court." Innerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, ^ 8. In
reviewing a summary judgment ruling, the appellate court "considers] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," which in this case is Ms. Brown, "and
affirm[s] only where it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues
of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Swenson v.
Erickson, 2000 UT 16, \ 10, 998 P.2d 807 {"Swenson F) (emphasis added).
The interpretation of restrictive covenants is generally governed by the same rules
of construction applicable to contract interpretation. See id. at ^j 11. "The trial court's
interpretation of the language of a restrictive covenant, absent resort to extrinsic
evidence, presents a question of law . .. review[ed] for correctness." Id.; see also Deep
Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, \ 10, 178 P.3d 886 (stating that
a trial court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law reviewed for correctness);
Mark Technologies Corp. v. Utah Resources Int'l, Inc., 2006 UT App. 418, ^ 4, 147 P.3d
509 (same). Likewise, the determination of whether contractual language is ambiguous is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ^ 8,
155P.5d917.
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On the second issue, in reviewing the entry of a permanent injunction, appellate
courts consider "whether the trial courts exercised its discretion using sound equitable
principles based on all the facts and circumstances." Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. City of
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ^j 16, 13 P.3d 581; see also Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero,
858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993).
Finally, with regard to the third issue, whether an award of attorney fees was
properly made is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. See EDSA/Cloward, LLC v.
Klibanoff 2008 UT App 284, \ 8, 192 P.3d 296.
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
The issue of whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to
Appellee was properly preserved for appeal, because the trial court received complete
briefing and held a hearing on Appellee's motion for summary judgment. See R. 48, 55,
64, 78. In addition, each component of the first issue, including the court's ambiguity
determination and its interpretation of the contract, was raised in the briefing and at oral
argument. See generally id.
Appellant preserved the issue of whether the permanent injunction was properly
entered, including the whether the scope of the injunction was overbroad, by arguing that
the injunction was improper and that there was no threat of any future violation, and by
objecting to the form of order submitted to the court by Appellee. See R. 110-11.
The propriety of the attorney fee award was properly preserved, because the issue
was raised in Appellee's affidavits of attorney fees and costs, see R. 79, 102, and in
Appellant's Motion to Tax Plaintiffs Attorneys' Fees and Costs. See R. 83.
3

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to, this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves what amounts to the persecution of a single neighbor by the

overly-active Board of the HOA, and the overly-restrictive manner in which the HOA
seeks to construe the CC&R's. The HOA commenced an investigation against Ms.
Brown after one of its members apparently learned that renters were at the house on one
occasion in February 2007. The HOA also discovered that Ms. Brown had advertised her
property for vacation rentals with a three-day to four-day minimum stay on the Internet.
See R. 46, Ex. E & Ex. F. Armed with this minimal information, the HOA commenced
this case against Ms. Brown in April 2007, seeking to obtain a judicial definition - at Ms.
Brown's expense - of a portion of the CC&Rs that was not defined in the document, had
never been put to a vote before the HOA membership, and could not be defined by the
HOA or its attorneys.
The facts that came out through discovery, in the parties' briefing, and in the
hearing on the HOA's summary judgment were slightly - but significantly - different
from those originally alleged by the HOA. Specifically, while Ms. Brown acknowledged
that she had, on occasion, rented her South Ridge property for periods of at least a week
at a time, she did not ever rent her property for less than that period. See R. 124 at 15 ("I
don't rent my one on a nightly basis ever. Never have, never will."). Thus, despite the
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statements on her website advertisements that the property was available for three- or
four-night rentals., she had never actually rented the property for such a short period, and
the HOA provided no evidence to the contrary. In fact, the online calendar relied upon
by the HOA to show that Ms. Brown did rent her property for stays shorter than a week
actually showed the times when the property was not available for rent, because Ms.
Brown and her family would be using the property. See, e.g., R. 65.
Accordingly, the question before the Court at the time of the summary judgment
hearing was whether Ms. Brown's occasional weekly rentals of her property violated the
CC&Rs. See R. 124 at 16 ("[T]hat's the question, whether that [weekly rental] does in
fact put you in violation of the CC&R's."). Even though the trial judge admitted at the
commencement of the hearing that the phrase appeared to be ambiguous, the court
answered this question in the affirmative, incorrectly determining that the phrase "nightly
rental or similar use" was unambiguous as a matter of law, and that the phrase meant any
rental for less than thirty days. On the basis of this ruling, the court imposed a permanent
injunction against Ms. Brown, and it awarded costs and attorney fees to the HOA. Ms.
Brown now appeals these rulings.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The HOA filed the Complaint in this matter on April 23, 2007. See R. 1. Ms.

Brown was personally served with the Complaint on May 5, 2007, in her home state of
California. See R. 8.
After a brief discovery period, the HOA filed a motion for summary judgment,
seeking not only a ruling that Ms. Brown had violated the CC&R's but also a permanent
5

injunction precluding her from renting her property for any period of less than thirty
days. See R. 43. Ms. Brown submitted an opposition to the motion on February 11,
2008, see R. 55, along with a declaration in opposition to the motion. See R. 64. The
HOA filed a reply memorandum on March 5, 2008. See R. 67.
The district court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on May 9,
2008. See R. 78.3 Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted the HOA's motion,
instructing the HOA to work with Ms. Brown to prepare the proposed order, to work with
Ms. Brown to carefully draft the order of injunctive relief, and to submit an affidavit of
attorney fees. See id. In opposition to the HOA's submission of its affidavit of attorney
fees and costs, see R. 79, Ms. Brown filed a Motion to Tax Plaintiffs Attorneys' Fees
and Costs. See R. 83. After the HOA prepared its own order and essentially refused to
consider any input from Ms. Brown, the parties submitted competing, with each side
objecting to the other's orders on various grounds. See R. 98, 110. In a Ruling and Order
dated August 29, 2008, the trial court partially reduced the amount of attorney fees and
costs sought by the HOA. See R. 108-110.4 In addition, the court ruled that the HOA's
proposed order more closely reflected its summary judgment ruling. See R. 110-11, Ex.
D at 3-4. The court therefore executed the form of order submitted by the HOA, making
two revisions to the text of the order. See R. 113-14, Ex. A at 1-2. Specifically, the trial
court struck from the order language indicating that Ms. Brown "threatens to continue

Ms. Brown appeared pro se in the trial court proceedings.
3

A copy of the hearing transcript is attached as Exhibit C to the Addendum.
The Ruling and Order is attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum.
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violating the CC&Rs" and "threatens to continue renting" the property. R. 114; Ex. A at
.2 (emphases added). The executed Order and Judgment states only that Ms. Brown
violated the CC&Rs by renting her property for periods as short as one week, and it
indicates nothing about any continued threat of any violation. See id.
On September 22, 2008, the Court entered the final Judgment, awarding the HOA
$11,262.50 in attorney fees and $310.00 in costs, for a total award of $11,572.50. See R.
117-18; Ex. B at 1-2. Ms. Brown timely filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2008.
SeeR. 120.
Several months after the entry of the final Judgment, on February 9, 2009, the
HOA filed a Motion for Contempt, see R. 129, contending that Ms. Brown had violated
the trial court's injunction by having "renters" in her home without providing prior
written notice to the HOA. See R. 134, 135. Ms. Brown filed an opposition to the
motion for contempt on February 27, 2009, in which she informed the HOA and the court
that the alleged "renters" at the property were not renters at all, but family members of
Ms. Brown. See R. 140. Although the record does not so indicate, the case docket shows
the Court held a telephone conference with the parties on April 21, 2009. Ms. Brown
subsequently filed a proposed Stipulated Order Following Hearing on Plaintiffs "Motion
for Contempt" on April 23, 2009. The proposed order was not signed by opposing
counsel, nor has it been executed by the court. See R. Vol. 2 (unnumbered pages at front
of Vol. 2). As of this writing, no further proceedings have occurred in the trial court.
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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Brown owns a home located at 4059 Sunrise Drive in Park City, Utah, within

the South Ridge Subdivision of the Jeremy Ranch area. The property is subject to certain
recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (the "CC&Rs"). See Ex. B to R. 46.5
In April 2007, the South Ridge Homeowners' Association, of which Ms. Brown is a
member, filed suit against her for allegedly violating the following provision of the
CC&R's: "No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will be allowed on any single
family residential lot." Ex. B at to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at 15 (Art. X, Sec. 2(a))
(hereinafter, "Section 2(a)," or the "nightly rental" provision"). The Complaint alleged
that Ms. Brown had improperly advertised her home for rent on the Internet, and that
neighbors of Ms. Brown had discovered renters at the home in February 2007. See R. at
2-3.
Although the Complaint included a general and unspecified claim for direct and
consequential damages, it did not allege that any actual, specific damages had resulted
from Ms. Brown's conduct. See R. at 4. In fact, apart from its request for attorney fees
and costs, the HOA did not seek any damages in its motion for summary judgment, nor
did it otherwise suggest that any damages had actually occurred. See R. 43-44; id. 124 at
6 ("THE COURT: I see. So you're not looking for damages? MR. LEE: No, we're
not."). Thus, the primary form of relief requested by the HOA was injunctive. See R. 43.
As Ms. Brown forthrightly acknowledged in the proceedings below, during 2006
and 2007, she occasionally rented her South Ridge home for periods of at least a week at
5

A copy of the CC&Rs is also attached as Exhibit E to the Addendum.
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a time. See R at 48, | 12. Nothing in the record establishes that Ms. Brown rented her
home for less than a week. To the contrary, the evidence relied upon by the HOA in an
effort to show that Ms. Brown had rented for shorter periods of time actually
demonstrated that Ms. Brown and her family were the ones who stayed at the home for
periods shorter than a week. See R. at 56-57. Moreover, the only factual finding made
by the trial court on the subject states simply that "defendant has rented the Residence for
periods as short as one week." R. 114, ^f 3, Ex. A at 2, ^f 3 (emphasis added).
The CC&Rs, recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office on August 13,
1993, include various restrictions on property use in the South Ridge Subdivision. See
generally Ex. B to R. 46; Ex. E. The specific provision the HOA claims Ms. Brown
violated appears in the following paragraph:
No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes. No
buildings shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot
other than one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in
height exclusive of basement. No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use
will be allowed on any single family residential lot. The structures existing
on lots 101 and 102 at the time of this declaration are exempted from this
selection.
Ex. B to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at 15 (emphasis added). Despite the fact that the CC&Rs
contain a "Definitions" section, including definitions of twelve different terms, see Ex. B
to R. 46 at 3-4; Ex. E at 3-4, the CC&Rs do not define any of the terms in the provision
Ms. Brown is alleged to have violated. Specifically, the CC&Rs do not define the term
"timeshare;" they do not define "nightly rental;" and they do not define "similar uses."
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Not only do the CC&Rs fail to define "nightly rental," but another provision of the
CCRs expressly grants homeowners the right to rent their properties "from time to time,"
without specifying the length of time for which they may do so:
The lands within the property shall be used exclusively for single family
residential living purposes and shall never be occupied or used for any
commercial or business purpose other than traditional home business
conducted within the home and except that the Declarant or its duly
authorized agent may use any lot owned by Declarant as a sales office,
sales model, or property office or rental office, and with the further
exception that any owner or his duly authorized agent may rent or lease
said owner's residential building from time to time.
Ex. B to R. 46 at 18, Ex. E at 18, (Art. 10, Sec. 16) (emphasis added) (hereinafter,
"Section 16"). This provision appears in the same Article of the CC&Rs as the "nightly
rental" provision, entitled "Article X, Use Restrictions." Ex. B to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at
15.
The HOA's motion for summary judgment argued that the CC&Rs generally
prohibited "short-term" rentals, which the HOA claimed was any period less than thirty
days. See R. 50. According to the HOA, Ms. Brown's admission that she had rented her
residence for periods as short as one week mandated summary judgment in favor of the
HOA, because a week's rental fell within the CC&R's ostensible prohibition of "shortterm rentals. See R. 51.
At oral argument on the HOA's motion for summary judgment, the district court
acknowledged early on that the "nightly rental" provision was "perhaps ambiguous." R.
124 at 3; Ex. C at 3. The court went on to state that, "I guess my concern is that at least
on summary judgment, that this indeed may be an ambiguous sentence and restriction
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that is subject to the need for some testimony." Id. at 4. When presented by the HOA
with the definition of "nightly boardinghouse" included in a Summit County business
licensing ordinance, the court further remarked that the thirty-day definition provided by
the HOA based upon the ordinance was "not a definition I would have expected, in all
candor." R. 124 at 9; Ex. C at 9.
Despite these observations, the trial court went on to grant the HOA's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that the proper definition of "nightly rental," as the term was
used in the CC&Rs, was "a rental less than 30 days." R. 124 at 50; Ex. C at 50. The
court also stated that anything less than a thirty-day rental was a commercial or business
use of the property, which was precluded by Section 16 and the CC&Rs as a whole. In
addition, the Court relied heavily upon the Summit County business ordinance and the
manner in which the term "nightly" is used therein. See, e.g., R. 124 at 24; Ex C at 24.
However, the ordinance was not presented by the HOA until the day of the hearing, and it
is not included in the record.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the HOA should be
reversed. The court's judgment relies on its significant misinterpretation of the operative
provision of the CC&R's, which proscribes "nightly rental or similar use." The court
first erroneously determined the language was unambiguous as a matter of law, and then
it concluded - again as a matter of law - that "nightly rental or similar use" means any
rental for less than thirty (30) days including the "weekly" rentals Ms. Brown
acknowledged had occurred.
11

The trial court's initial determination of ambiguity was legally incorrect. Because
Ms. Brown's interpretation of the phrase is equally - if not more - tenable than the
HOA's, the trial court erred by rejecting her interpretation and deeming the phrase
unambiguous. Further, to resolve the ambiguity, the Court should have applied the well
established rule of interpretation calling for the narrow construction of restrictive
covenants in favor of free property use. Alternatively, the court erred by failing to admit
extrinsic evidence for purposes of making the factual determination of the parties' intent.
The court's summary judgment ruling must be reversed.
In addition, the interpretation of "nightly rental" concocted by the HOA and
adopted by the Court is incorrect as a matter of law. That is, even if the trial court's
ruling on ambiguity was correct, the court's interpretation of the language was erroneous,
because it is contrary to the plain language of the CC&Rs. The term "nightly" has a clear
and simple meaning, which is "by the night" or "every night." The term is not the
equivalent of "weekly," "monthly," or "annually," and, if the drafters of the CC&R had
intended to proscribe "weekly" rentals, they easily could have done so. They did not.
Reading the CC&Rs as a whole supports this interpretation. And, application of the well
settled principle of covenant interpretation that restrictions should be construed narrowly
mandates this interpretation.
The trial court also erred by entering a permanent injunction against Ms. Brown.
As the trial court itself acknowledged, the HOA failed to establish there was any threat of
any continuing violation, a crucial prerequisite to the extraordinary remedy of a
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permanent injunction. Absent such a threat, the injunction was improper and must be
vacated.
Additionally, the scope of the injunction was overbroad and invasive, going far
beyond what was required to achieve its alleged purpose. The injunction improperly
requires Ms. Brown to provide private information to the HOA any time she has visitors
in the home - whether they be friends or family - including the names of every visitor
and the length of their intended stay at the home. This measure is surely unnecessary to
prevent rentals of the home, which Ms. Brown has stopped doing in any event. Further,
the injunction prohibits and improperly restricts Ms. Brown from doing something she
has every right to do, i.e., to allow friends and family to stay at her home, at no charge
and at any time, without alerting the entire neighborhood as to her intentions. As such,
even if an injunction remains in place - which it should not - it must be limited in scope
to precluding rentals of the property, not visitors.
Finally, if this Court reverses the summary judgment ruling, then the award of
costs and attorney fees to the HOA must also be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED THE HOA'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In at least two critical respects, the trial court's analysis of the HOA's motion for

summary judgment was flawed. First, the court's determination of ambiguity was in
error, because Ms. Brown's proposed interpretation of the "nightly rental" provision was
as tenable as the HOA's, if not more so. To resolve the ambiguity, the Court should
apply the well settled rule of construction applicable to restrictive covenants, which
13

requires such covenants to be construed against the party seeking to enforce them, and in
favor of the unrestricted use of property. In the alternative, the trial.court's erroneous
determination of ambiguity requires reversal for assessment of extrinsic evidence and
resolution of the factual question of the parties' intent.
Second, even if the ambiguity determination was correct, the court's interpretation
of the provision was incorrect, contrary to the provision's plain language, and
unsupported by the CC&Rs as a whole. Thus, even if this Court does not reverse the
ambiguity determination, it should rule as a matter of law that the "nightly rental"
provision means what it says - that rentals by the night, not weekly or monthly rentals,
are precluded under the CC&R's.
A.

The Trial Court Erroneously Determined that the "Nightly Rental"
Provision Was Unambiguous

The district court in this case erred on the first and most fundamental
determination in this matter - whether the provision of the CC&Rs precluding "nightly
rental" is ambiguous as a matter of law. Because there are more than one tenable
interpretations of the provision, the language is ambiguous. As such, the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of Ms. Brown, or the case should be remanded for
consideration of extrinsic evidence.
As mentioned above, the interpretation of restrictive covenants is generally
governed by the same rules of construction applicable to contract interpretation. See
Swenson /, 2000 UT 16, ]f 11. "If the language is unambiguous, [the court] will
determine 'the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a
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matter of law.'" Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT App 34, ^ 11, 131 P.3d 267 ("Swenson
IF) (quoting Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, \ 10,
94 P.3d 292). "A contractual term is ambiguous if, looking to the language of the
contract alone, it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one way such
that there are tenable positions on both sides." Deep Creek Ranch, 2008 UT 3, ^ 13.
More specifically, "[a] contractual term or provision is ambiguous 'if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies.'" Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 25, 190 P.3d 1269
(citations and quotations omitted).
In general, the court must make a determination of whether a contract is facially
ambiguous before resorting to parol evidence of the parties' intent. See id. at ^f 25
('Thus, before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination
of facial ambiguity."). Nevertheless, in making the initial ambiguity determination, a
court may consider "relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations" in
analyzing the contractual language, because otherwise the determination would be
"'based solely upon the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and
experience.'" Id. at ^j 26 (quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass V?, 907 P.2d 264,
268 (Utah 1995)). In assessing such extrinsic evidence, however, the Utah Supreme
Court stressed that there is no "preference for that evidence over the language of the
contract." Id. at f 27.
In this case, the parties each offered tenable interpretations of the agreement. In
fact, based on the plain language of the CC&R's (and as discussed more fully below, in
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Section LB), the HOA's interpretation was less tenable than the interpretation offered by
Ms. Brown. According to the HOA, the term "nightly rentals" equates to "short term
rentals," which it interprets as any rental for a period of less than a month. The HOA
supports its interpretation by claiming that, since "timeshares" and "similar use[s]" are
also prohibited, and since "[t]imeshares are most frequently sold in one-week
increments," the CC&Rs "prohibit nightly rentals, weekly rentals, such as those typically
used in timeshares, and all other similar, short term uses. . . ." R. 50. The HOA also
claims that the provision of the CC&Rs which expressly permits rentals or leases "from
time to time" supports its interpretation, because this type of rentals is "grouped with
leases, which are typically long term and grant to the tenant a real estate interest." R. 51.
In addition, the HOA relied on the belatedly-submitted Summit County business
ordinance, which purportedly defines "nightly lodging facility" as "any place or a portion
thereof that is rented or otherwise made available to persons for transient lodging
purposes for a period of less than 30 days." R. 164 at 8, Ex. C at 8. However, the
ordinance was not presented until the hearing, providing Ms. Brown with no opportunity
to respond to the evidence or to submit competing evidence. The ordinance also has not
been made part of the record, precluding this Court's consideration of it on appeal. See,
e.g., State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 ("An appellate court's 'review is . . .
limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" (quoting Wilderness Bldg.
Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). Hearing these arguments, the
trial court adopted the HOA's interpretation as its own.
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The interpretation offered by Ms. Brown, but rejected by the trial court, is equally
if not more tenable than the HOA's interpretation. Under Ms. Brown's interpretation,
only rentals "by the night" or for less than a week are precluded under Section 2(a). Ms.
Brown's interpretation relies upon and is supported by the plain language of the CC&Rs.
Specifically, under common usage, the term "nightly" means "every night," "at or by
night," "happening, done, or used by night or every night," and/or "of or relating to the
night or every night." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, definition of "nightly,"
available at <a href=Mhttp://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nightlyM>nightly</a>.
The term "nightly" does not have the same meaning as "weekly," "monthly," or
"annually," but instead is used in contrast to such terms. Whereas "nightly" means "by
night" or "every night;" "weekly" means "every week" or "by the week." See id.,
definition of "weekly," available at <a href=,fhttp://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/weekly">weekly</a>. Likewise, a property available for rent by
the night is not necessarily available for rent by the week or by the month; and, a property
available for rent by the week or by the month is not necessarily available for rent by the
night. To hold otherwise would impermissibly alter the meaning of the language. In the
words of the Supreme Court in Daines, the language of the provision is more than
"reasonably susceptible" to Ms. Brown's interpretation, see Ward, 907 P.2d at 269,
which is based upon the common usage and the basic dictionary definition of the term.
Ms. Brown's interpretation is also supported by the CC&Rs as a whole. In
interpreting a contract, the court is to "'consider each contract provision . . . in relation to
all the others, with a view towards giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Cafe Rio, Inc.
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v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, \ 25, 207 P.3d 1235 (quoting Green River
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, \ 17, 84 P.3d 1134). In the same Article in which the
"nightly rental" provision appears, the CC&Rs expressly grant to subdivision owners the
right to "rent or lease" their properties from "time to time." See Ex. B to R. at 46 at 18;
Ex. E at 18. This provision demonstrates that subdivision owners are permitted to rent
or lease their properties, and it does not limit the length of time for which the owners may
do so; instead, it simply restricts the right by saying the renal or lease can only occur
from time to time. The only other modification or qualification of this right occurs in
Section 2(a), which states, simply, that a rental may not be "nightly." Tf an owner may
rent his or her property, and if just one of the two restrictions on the right provides that all
types of rentals but "nightly" rentals are permitted, it defies logic to stretch this limitation
to encompass anything more than it says - to construe the term more narrowly would
unduly restrict the express right to rent granted in Section 16.
Further, contrary to the HOA's argument, the "grouping" of the term "lease" with
the term "rent" in Section 16 does not suggest or otherwise support the imposition of a
time limitation on the right to rent expressly granted under Section 16. The term "lease"
is commonly used as a synonym of the term "rent," just as the term "rental agreement" is
commonly used in place of "lease agreement." The term "lease" does not imply any
specific term or duration for which a property may be "leased" or "rented." Further,
although the term "lease" may sometimes associated with the written document
memorializing a party's rental of a property, the fact that a party enters into a lease or
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rental agreement at all, i.e., the formality of the transaction is more suggestive of a longer
lease term than the labeling of the agreement as a "lease" or "rental" agreement.
Finally, even if the term "lease" were distinguishable from the term "rent" in the
manner suggested by the HOA, the mere "grouping" of the two terms is not
determinative. The language of the CC&Rs clearly provides both alternatives - an owner
may "lease or rent" his or her property from time to time; the language does not say that
one form of lease or rental agreement is preferable, and it does not specify whether long
or short-term periods are contemplated. Thus, Section 16 supports the interpretation of
Section 2(a) to permit any rentals other than "nightly" rentals.
Because Ms. Brown's interpretation of the operative provision is at least as tenable
as the HOA's, the Court's determination that the Section 2(a) unambiguous as a matter of
law was reversible error. See Deep Creek Ranch, 2008 UT 3,^15 (holding that the term
"surplus" property was, "as a matter of law," "ambiguous on its face" because each party
presented tenable position on meaning of term).
1.

Under the Rule Requiring Restrictive Covenants to Be Construed
Narrowly Against the Party Seeking to Enforce Them, the
Ambiguity Must Be Resolved in Favor of Ms. Brown

The trial court improperly failed to consider a basic rule of construction applicable
to restrictive covenants, which is commonly used to resolve ambiguities in such
covenants. Pursuant to this rule, "restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." Dansie v. HiCountry Estates Homeowners' Ass 'n, 1999 UT 62, f 14, 987 P.2d 30 (quotations and
citations omitted) (emphases added); see also St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's
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Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) ("Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are
not favored in the law and are strictly construed in favor of free and unrestricted use of
property."); Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT App 34, t 8, 131 P.3d 267 ("Swenson IF)
(same).
This rule of strict construction is clearly well established in Utah case law, and it is
widely-recognized and applied in other states. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court
recently applied the principle to resolve the ambiguity in a restrictive covenant stating
that "no lot shall be used except for residential purposes." See Scott v. Walker, 645
S.E.2d 278 (Va. 2007). Due to the ambiguity inherent in the term "residential" as used in
the covenants, the court resolved the ambiguity by interpreting the term "in favor of the
free use of property and against restrictions," concluding that the nightly and weekly
rentals engaged in by the defendants did not violate the covenant. Id. at 218 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
In Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1997), the Oregon Supreme Court
likewise concluded that the term "residential" was ambiguous as used in the restrictive
covenants at issue. According to the Court, the provision was ambiguous under both an
examination of the text alone, and under an assessment of the available extrinsic
evidence, because the term "'residence' can refer simply to a building used as a dwelling
place, or it can refer to a place where one intends to live for a long time.'" Id. at 1021.
"[I]f 'residential' refers to an intention to live in a home for more than a temporary
sojourn or transient visit, even defendants' own use of the property, as well as their rental
use, is not 'residential." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, to resolve the ambiguity, the
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court turned to "appropriate maxims of construction," including the "familiar rule of law
that restrictive covenants are to be construed most strictly against the covenant." Id. at
364 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Application of this maxim led the
court to conclude that the defendants' rentals were permissible under the covenants. See
/^. at 1023.6

Numerous courts have applied this rule in a similar fashion, as should this court.
See, e.g., Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901, 904 (Fla. 1925) ("[A]mbiguity or doubt must be
resolved against the person claiming the right to enforce the covenants."); Boyce v.
Simpson, 746 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring that restrictive
covenants are strictly construed, and ambiguity is resolved in favor of the homeowner);
Mullen v. Silvercreek Condominium Owner's Assoc., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 484, 487-88 (Mo.
App. 2006) (holding that provisions restricting use to "single family residential use" and
prohibiting business uses should be interpreted "narrowly in favor of the free use of
property). Applying the rule of construction in this case requires the ambiguity in
Section 2(a) to be interpreted in favor of Ms. Brown.
2.

In the Alternative, the Case Should Be Remanded for Consideration
of Extrinsic Evidence

Alternatively, the case must be remanded for consideration of extrinsic evidence
of the parties' intent - a factual determination inappropriate for summary judgment. See

In each of these cases, the courts use the term "nightly" in accordance with the common,
dictionary definition of the term, and they use the term in contrast to "weekly." See
Walker, 645 S.E.2d at 280 (referring to rentals at issue as "nightly and/or weekly");
Yogman, 937 P.2d at 1020 (referencing the "daily and/or weekly" fee charged to renters
by the defendants).
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Deep Creek Ranch, \ 31 (stating that remand was necessary for resolution of the "factual
issue" of the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence); see also Ward, 907 P.2d at 296
(reversing trail court's grant of summary judgment and remanding for consideration of
extrinsic evidence).
At the summary judgment hearing, the HOA asserted that Ms. Brown would be
unable to supply any evidence to ascertain the parties' intent, even if she were provided
with the opportunity, relying in part on its own unsuccessful effort to contact the
developer of the South Ridge Subdivision. See R. 164 at 4-5. However, even if the HOA
were unable to contact the developer, other evidence, such as testimony on the
interpretation by other members of the HOA or other homeowners' association board
members, and evidence of industry usage and custom, could also be admitted and
considered on the issue. See, e.g., Ragen v. Petersen, No. D040766, 2004 WL 385347,
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. Mar. 2, 2004) (indicating that court had previously remanded case for
consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret CC&Rs, including without limitation
evidence of the intent of original developer and evidence on industry custom and usage).
Indeed, Ms. Brown stated at the hearing that she would seek out utilize just this type of
evidence for purposes of a factual hearing or trial on the matter. See R. 164 at 42. The
extrinsic evidence presented by the HOA at the summary judgment hearing - the Summit
County business licensing ordinance - also qualifies as this type of evidence, i.e., usage
of the term in a similar but not identical setting. Ms. Brown was denied the opportunity

A copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the Addendum as Exhibit F.
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to respond to or submit conflicting evidence, because the HOA did not identify the
ordinance until the hearing. Thus, the HOA's claim that no extrinsic evidence could be
presented on remand should be rejected. Further, as mentioned above, the resolution of
the parties' intent is a factual issue inappropriate for summary judgment.
B.

Whether or Not the "Nightly Rental" Provision Is Ambiguous, the
Trial Court's Interpretation of the Provision Was Incorrect

Even if the "nightly rental" provision is deemed unambiguous, the meaning
supplied by the trial court is simply incorrect, because it does not coincide with the plain
and ordinary meaning of the language. In other words, the language of the CC&Rs is
"not reasonably susceptible to [the HOA's] interpretation." Dairies, 2008 UT 51, Tf 34
(concluding that the plaintiffs interpretation of contractual language was inconsistent
with the agreement's unambiguous and plain language).
In the Order and Judgment memorializing its summary judgment ruling, the trial
court stated:
The CCRs prohibit use of any South Ridge Subdivision home for "nightly
rental or similar use[s] . . . ," which the Court interprets, consistent with
Summit County business licensing ordinances, as any rental for a period of
less than 30 days.
R. 114 at 2; Ex. A at 2. This interpretation is flawed for a number of reasons.
First, as discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms at issue
contradict the trial court's interpretation. The term "nightly" has a specific meaning,
which, essentially, is "by the night." The term "nightly" does not - and cannot - mean
"thirty days or less," because such a definition would conflate the term "nightly" with
"weekly." These terms are not the same. As stated, "nightly" is defined as "every night"
23

or "by night;" by contrast, "weekly" is defined as "every week" or "by the week." If the
developers had intended to proscribe "weekly" rentals, they could have easily done so.
Cf Scott, 645 S.E.2d at 283 ("If the restrictive covenant at issue was intended to prevent
the short-term rental. . ., 'it would have been easy to say so, and it would not likely have
been left to the uncertainty of inference.'" (citation omitted)). Instead, the developers
selected the term "nightly" to describe the only type of rentals that would be prohibited.
Second, the appearance of the term "similar uses" in the "nightly rental" provision
does not contradict this analysis, but instead supports it. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Swenson /, where a specific enumeration precedes a general term such as
"similar uses," the court will not override the specific language. In Swenson /, the court
considered a restrictive covenant prohibiting the use of any "trailer, basement, tent,
shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding" for human habitation. In determining whether
the construction of a workshop by the defendant would violate this provision, the court
noted that "the only term that could be read to allow the erection of Erickson's workshop
is 'other outbuildings.'" The court explained its reasoning as follows: "It is not this
court's practice to override specific language with general provisions dealing with wholly
distinct subject matter. Under the well-established rule of construction esjudem generis,
general language must be confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which
proceeds it, unless a contrary intention is shown." Swenson /, 2000 UT 16, ^| 16; see also
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Notably, the HOA at any time could have clarified the CC&Rs to restrict all rentals for
less than thirty days, by proposing an amendment and putting the amendment to a vote of
the members. The HOA apparently chose not to go this route, proceeding directly against
Ms. Brown instead.
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Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, ^j 25 (stating that, under the rule of esjudem generis, the court
"determine[s] the meaning of a general contractual term based on the specific
enumerations that surround that term"). The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result
in Cafe Rio, where the court determined, 'it is plain that the parties did not intend the
general term 'obstruction' to include buildings." Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, \ 32. Here, as in
Swenson I and Cafe Rio, the general term "similar uses" may not be used to expand upon
or override the meaning of the preceding enumeration.
Third, in defining the term "nightly" as anything less than monthly, the court
improperly relied upon the purported Summit County business licensing ordinance
presented by the HOA at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. However,
the purported ordinance was only partially read into the record, see R. 124, at 8, and it
was not made part of the record on appeal. Thus, this Court cannot consider the
purported ordinance in reviewing the trial court's determination. See, e.g., Pliego, 1999
UT 8, ^f 7. Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the ordinance, and even if the
Court were to presume that the ordinance provides as indicated by counsel, the ordinance
does not support the trial court's interpretation. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court
in Dairies, extrinsic evidence considered by a court in the ambiguity determination may
not be given a preference "over the language of the contract," Dairies, 2008 UT 51, ]j 27,
which is precisely what the trial court did in this case. Stated differently, a trial court
may not "allow surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a
contract would not otherwise permit." Id. "Thus, even though we permit admission of
extrinsic evidence to support of a claim of ambiguity in contractual language, the claim
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'must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used.'" Id. at ^ 31 (citation
omitted). For these reasons, the court's reliance upon the belatedly-submitted ordinance
was error.
In short, whether or not the "nightly rental" provision is ambiguous, the court's
interpretation was incorrect. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for a ruling in
accordance with the proper interpretation of the term.
C.

Renting Property for Less than Thirty Days Does Not Transform
Single Family Residential Use to Commercial or Business Use

The HOA argued below that business uses are prohibited under Section 16 of the
CC&R's, and that Ms. Brown's occasional weekly rental of her property was a prohibited
business use. According to the HOA, Ms. Brown's business use of her property also
conflicted with statement in Section 2(a) the CC&Rs that the lots shall be used "for single
family residential purposes." Two serious flaws mar this argument.
First, regardless of how the HOA contends "business use" is defined, the very
same provision that precludes business uses expressly and specifically grants to the
owners the right to "rent or lease" their homes "from time to time," and it does so without
specifying the length of time for which a property may be rented.
Second, numerous courts have considered and rejected this same argument, as
should this Court. For example, in the Scott case discussed above, the Virginia Supreme
Court concluded that nightly and weekly rentals did not violate a restrictive covenant
stating that "no lot shall be used except for residential purposes." See Scott, 645 S.E.2d
278. Unlike in this case, the covenant in Scott did not specify that any rentals were
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precluded, nor did it use the term "nightly." Nevertheless, the Court determined that the
nightly and weekly rentals engaged in by the defendants did not constitute using the
home as a business, noting that the length of time for which the owners rented their
properties was not the critical factor - the critical factor was whether the property was
used for living purposes, remarking that, "[a] transitory use does not defeat the residential
status." See id. at 216-17 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Yogman, 937 P.2d 1019, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed a
situation in which the short-term vacation rentals of their properties by certain
subdivision owners were alleged to have violated the applicable restrictive covenants.
Although the covenants in Yogman did not specifically address "nightly rental," the
covenants generally proscribed commercial uses, stating:
All lots within said tract shall be used exclusively for residential purposes
and no commercial enterprise shall be constructed or permitted on any of
said property.
Id. at 1020. Moreover, like Ms. Brown, the defendants in Yogman "use[d] their beach
house as a vacation home and, when they are not using it themselves, rent if for short
period of time to others, who likewise use it as a vacation home." Id. Construing the
term "residential," the Oregon Supreme Court held that the defendants' short term rentals
did not violate the covenant, stating that, "if 'residential' refers to an intention to live in a
home for more than a temporary sojourn or transient visit, even defendants' own use of
the property, as well as their rental use, is not 'residential." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Mullen, 195
S.W.3d 484, in which a number of owners sought a declaratory judgment that nightly
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rentals were permitted under the governing declarations. As in Yogrnan, there was no
provision expressly addressing "nightly rental," but there were provisions restricting use
of the properties to "single family residential use" and prohibiting business uses. See id.
at 487-88. As in this case, however, the proscription of business uses was modified by
the grant of the right to "rent or lease his (their) condominium unit from time to time . . .
." Id. at 488. Interpreting these covenants "narrowly in favor of the free use of
property," the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the owners were not
prohibited from "renting or leasing their units on a daily or nightly term"' and that such
use did not violate the covenant. The hdiillen case strongly supports a similar outcome
here.
As these cases establish, nightly and even weekly rentals do not amount to a
business or commercial use of property. Thus, the HOA's argument to that effect must
be rejected.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING A
BROAD AND INVASIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY THREAT OF CONTINUING HARM
The permanent injunction entered against Ms. Brown was improperly granted

because the HO A failed to establish any threat of ongoing harm or violations. Further,
the scope of the injunction far exceeds the relief necessary to achieve the HOA's goal.
A.

No Continuing Harm, No Permanent Injunction

A permanent injunction is an extraordinary remedy, to be utilized only sparingly
and only in atypical situations. See Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425
(Utah 1983) ("Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly
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granted."); see also O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 1002 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that injunctive relief is an extraordinary
remedy). To obtain a permanent injunction, a party must establish, among other things, a
threat of continuing harm. See Cqmp Coast to Coast, Inc. v. Woodbine Investments, LLC,
No. 08-CV-00981-REB, 2008 WL 4936205 (D. Colo. Nov. 17, 2008) ("[PJlaintiffs
cannot establish the type of ongoing or continuing threat of future harm that undergirds
the extraordinary remedy of permanent injunctive relief.").9 "Ordinarily, a permanent
injunction will only be granted after a full trial on the merits." Birch Creek Irrigation,
858 P.2d at 993-94.
Here, the trial court's entry of a permanent injunction contradicts its own ruling on
the subject. That is, the trial court specifically scratched out the portion of the Order and
Judgment indicating that Ms. Brown "threatens to continue violating the CCRs" and the
portion stating that she "threatens to continue renting" the property. R. 114, Ex. A at 2.
Despite its deliberate conclusion that no threat of continuing harm had been established,
the trial court entered a permanent injunction against Ms. Brown. Absent a finding of a
threat of continuing harm, entry of a permanent injunction is improper, and undermines
the very purpose injunctive relief, which is to prevent future acts or violations from
occurring - not to punish past violations. See U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Soc, 343
U.S. 326, 333 (1952); Mitchell v. Hertzke, 234 F.2d 183, 186-87 (10th Cir. 1956) ("[A]n
injunction will not issue merely to punish past violations but only to stop existing

A copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the Addendum as Exhibit G.
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violations or to prevent future infractions."). The permanent injunction should be
vacated.
B.

The Injunction Must Be Narrowed in Scope to Conform to Its
Purpose

The permanent injunction entered by the trial court is not only unjustified, it is
also far broader than necessary to achieve its ostensible purpose.
In addition to establishing the required elements, "an injunction must be narrowly
tailored to remedy the harm shown." Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations,
Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2002). For example, the Utah Supreme Court in a 1929
case reversed a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from allowing his cattle to
trespass on the plaintiffs lands, where "the effect of the injunction [was] to reach further
than the protection of the plaintiffs lands." Winters v. Turner, 278 P. 816, 822 (Utah
1929). The court explained:
[T]he plaintiffs lands are unenclosed and disconnected tracts scattered
through a much larger area of public lands. The defendant, in common
with the plaintiff and other persons, has the legal privilege to pasture and
graze his animals upon these public lands. If the defendant is enjoined
from trespassing upon the lands of the plaintiff upon pain of fine or
imprisonment for contempt of court, he is practically excluded from
making any use of the public lands adjoining and surrounding the plaintiffs
lands, and the result is that the plaintiff has the exclusive use not only of his
own lands, but of a much larger area of public lands. . . . The comparative
convenience or inconvenience of the parties from granting or withholding
an injunction sought should be considered, and none should be granted if it
would operate oppressively or inequitably or contrary to the real justice of
the case.
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The injunction requires that, any time she has family or friends visit her residence,
Ms. Brown must take the affirmative step of notifying the HOA in writing, one week in
advance, that visitors will be coming. Even more egregiously, the injunction requires
Ms. Brown to identify each of the visitors to the HOA, and to inform the HOA of how
long each visitor will stay at the home. As the trial court itself noted, Ms. Brown has the
unquestionable right to have friends and family visit her home whenever she sees fit. The
injunction improperly amounts to a prohibition of that right. See Winters, 278 P. at 822
(rejecting injunction that restricted defendant's right to use public property located close
to the plaintiffs property); see also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 500
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that additional injunctive relief was unnecessary where
defendant was compelled to return plaintiffs property and enjoined from using plaintiffs
confidential information).
III.

THE HOA IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
If the trial court's summary judgment ruling is reversed, then the judgment for

attorney fees entered by the court must also be reversed. This non-controversial
proposition has been repeatedly recognized by Utah courts. See, e.g., Ault v. Holden,
2002 UT 33, \ 48, 44 P.3d 781 ("In this case, we reverse the trial court's summary
judgment award in favor of the Holdens in its entirety, denying them any relief on the
merits at this point in the litigation. Given our reversal, we also reverse the award of
attorney fees and costs because the Holdens are no longer the prevailing party."); Harper
v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, \ 40, 26 P.3d 193 (reversing attorney fee award where
case was reversed).
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CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Ms. Brown respectfully asks the Court to
reverse the trial court's entry summary judgment and its award of attorney fees and costs,
and to either interpret the "nightly rental" provision as described herein, or tg remand for
consideration of extrinsic evidence. Ms. Brown also asks that the permanent injunction
be vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 2009.
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

James E. Magleby
Christine T. Greenwood
Attorneys Defendant-Appellant Lisa M. Brown
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation,

:
: ORDER AND JUDGMENT
:

Plaintiff,
v.

:

LISA M. BROWN,

: Civil No. 070500211
: Judge: Hilder
:

Defendant,

—oooOooo—
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on May 9,
2008. Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of plaintiff South Ridge Homeowners' Association.
Defendant Lisa M. Brown appeared pro se. Having considered the parties' written submissions
and arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court reached the following
conclusions:
1.

Read as a whole, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for

South Ridge Subdivision (the "CCRs") evince an intent to restrict use of the South Ridge
Subdivision lots to single-family residential purposes and to exclude business uses.

u u 0113

2.

The CCRs prohibit use of any South Ridge Subdivision home for "nightly rental

or similar use[s]...," which the Court interprets, consistent with Summit County business
licensing ordinances, as any rental for a period of less than 30 days.

far
3.

Defendant violated the CCR^ nnri throntnis to continue violating llic GGRs* by

using her South Ridge Subdivision residence at 4059 Sunrise Drive, Park City, Utah (the
"Residence") for business purposes. In particular, defendant has rented aa€Uhreatefl3 to continue
< renting the Residence for periods as short as one week.
4.

Defendant did not file a motion to compel arbitration and, given her substantial

participation in the litigation, she waived any right to arbitration.
5.

Defendant has raised no genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted and plaintiff is awarded JUDGMENT against defendant as follows:
A.

Defendant shall immediately cease and desist all efforts to rent the Residence or

otherwise make it available for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than 30 days.
B.

Defendant shall remove or retrieve all advertising and marketing materials by

which the Residence is offered for rent or for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than
30 days.
C.

Defendant is permanently enjoined from renting the Residence or otherwise

making it available for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than 30 days.

UOuilt

D.

This Order and Judgment shall not be construed to prohibit use of the Residence

by defendant's family and friends provided defendant delivers one-week advance written notice
to the president of South Ridge Homeowners' Association listing the name of each family
member and friend who will be using the Residence and the expected dates of use.
E.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against defendant for the reasonable

attorney's fees and costs it incurred in connection with this action, in an amount to be determined
by the Court after review of plaintiff s affidavit of fees and costs, any objection filed by defendant
within 30 days of receipt of plaintiff s affidavit and any response filed by plaintiff.
DATED this Jl{^

day of%#f2008.
BY THE CO

District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment
to be e-mailed to the following this

*^Z>

day of May, 2008.

Lisa M. Brown
3747 Norris Canyon Road
San Ramon, California 94583
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201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-322-2516
801-521-6280-fax
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rda@clydesnow.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

:
: JUDGMENT
:
:

v.

:

LISA M. BROWN,

: Civil No. 070500211
: Judge: Hilder
:

Defendant.

—oooOooo—

On August 29, 2008, the Court issued its Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to
Tax Attorney Fees. Based on that order, the affidavits in support of attorney's fees submitted by
Plaintiff, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff South Ridge Homeowners'
Association recover from Defendant Lisa M. Brown attorney's fees in the amount of $11,262.50

and costs in the amount of $310.00, for a total award of $11,572.50, with interest at the statutory
post-judgment rate of 5 42% until paid.
DATED this^22^day of September 2008.

District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Lisa M. Brown
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment to be emailed and mailed to the following this
Lisa M. Brown
373 Inman Court
Danville, California 94526

3

day of September 2008.
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ORIGINAL
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LISA M. BROWN,
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Third Judicial DistricPt
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May 9, 2008
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Deput V Clerk

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER
Third District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the State:

Eric P. Lee
DART & ADAMSON
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 9, 20O8)

3

COURT BAILIFF: Honorable Judge Robert Hilder presiding.

4

THE COURT: Go ahead and be seated, please, and good

5

afternoon.

6

Association vs. Lisa Brown, case No. 070500211.

7

appearances.

8
9
10

We're here on the matter of Southridge Homeowners
Please state

MR. LEE: Eric Lee for Southridge Homeowners Association
and with me at the table is Trudy Jakes the President of the
Association, your Honor.

11

THE COURT: Thank you.

12

MS. BROWN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Lisa Brown.

We're here on the

14

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and it has been

15

briefed by parties and Counsel.

16

on your motion, you lay out certain facts, and I understand

17

that many of them come from admissions, et cetera, and from

18

documents you attach.

19

Just preliminarily, Mr. Lee,

You have some concern about the response of Ms. Brown,

20

I think, in terms of what are properly —

21

Court in terms of facts to dispute the facts you allege.

22

I have m

23

refer to is a declaration.

24
25

properly before the
What

addition to the attachments such as the email you

I guess I want —

I have a declaration on the penalty

of perjury, which puts a new statute on (inaudible).

I think

~3~
1

what's alleged there is, to at least some degree, admissible;

2

but to me, the core issue comes down to if I'm to make a

3

determination that there are no genuinely disputed material

4

facts that would bar summary judgment, it comes down to the

5

meaning of Section 10 sub (2)(a) —

6

one —

7

the piece is why that is not perhaps ambiguous.

8
9

I think I'm on the right

and I guess what I want you to address fairly early in

I'm struggling.

You've tried to take the pieces and

show me what they mean, for example —

give me an example of

10

what a timeshare means; but timeshare has at least more than

11

one tenable meaning, I would think.

12

in front of me.

13

by now.

14
15

I'm sure that you've probably got it memorized

MR. LEE: And you are —
It is Section 10

16

I should have this section

you're correct, your Honor.

—

THE COURT: It's 10(2) (a).

Let me go there.

I just am not

17

m

18

seems like the critical language —

19

some language.

20

will be allowed on any single family residential lot."

21

it where I should be.

I know that.

Okay, 10(2) (a),

and tell me if I've missed

"No time share, nightly rental or similar use

I think it unambiguously suggests this is primarily

22

intended as a single family homeowners association m

the

23

neighborhood; but words such as "timeshare," which generally

24

has a meaning like —

25

time and weeks, but I think one meaning of that is actually

I see your meaning about blocks of

-41

ownership units versus rental, and similar use seems to be

2

somewhat vague.

3

I guess my concern is at least on summary judgment,

4

that this indeed may be an ambiguous sentence and restriction

5

that is subject to the need for some testimony, which might, in

6

a fairly quick order, resolve the issue of what it means; but

7

I'm struggling with whether it's sufficient at this time for

8

summary judgment.

9
10

Would you like —

address anything, of course, always,

Mr. Lee, but could you address my concern about that?

11

MR. LEE: I will of course address your concern,

12

your Honor.

13

Ms. Brown has raised in her moving papers as well, of course.

14

The first, I think, answer to your question is, I'm not sure

15

you're going to get anything more in trial than you're getting

16

in these moving papers.

17
18

I have the same concern, and it's a concern that

This is not a typ

THE COURT: Possibly not, because this has been around
a while.

19

MR. LEE: T h a t ' s r i g h t ,

20

THE COURT: Yeah.

21

MR. LEE: —

22

—

15 y e a r s —

the subdivision has been in place.

We

actually tried to locate the developers to get an affidavit

23

THE COURT: You can't find Mr. Doyale?

24

MR. LEE: Mr. Doyale and Mr. Barnes have not been

25

responsive to our efforts to find them.

—

~5~
1
2

THE COURT: I tried his divorce, among other things.
So I

—

3

MR. LEE: And I think my

4

THE COURT: —

5

MR. LEE: —

6

the divorce, and so

—

I don't think he's that far away.
I think my partner, Mr. Sessions handled

—

7

THE COURT: Indeed he did.

8

MR. LEE: And so we —

9
10

I remember now.

we thought we would have the

ability to find him; but you know, your Honor, this is —

the

Court has dealt with this kind of a situation before.

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. LEE: CC&R's are a contract between the Association

13

and the individuals, but they're certainly not a contract

14

drafted by the Association or individual owners, and so

—

15

THE COURT: That's the truth.

16

MR. LEE: So the intent of the Association, or the

17

intent of the individual owners is not necessarily going to be

18

relevant, I guess, to the question of meaning.

19

THE COURT: You've got a good point there.

It's where

20

—

how do we get to it, or how do we bind someone to it, until

21

maybe it's put before them.

22

try and mediate this.

23

out; but it's possible that Ms. Brown was proceeding under a

24

misunderstanding.

25

didn't actually go back and see what relief you sought.

I mean, may —

I'm not here to

This is something you guys have to work

You know, I did something really dumb.

I
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MR. LEE: Well, we seek injunctive relief, your Honor—

2

THE COURT : Yeah.

3

MR. LEE: —

4

and attorney's fees for having to enforce

it.

5

THE COURT : I see.

6

MR. LEE: No, we're not.

7

THE COURT : Yeah.

8

MR. LEE: We're looking for

9

THE COURT : Okay.
MR. LEE: —

10

So you're not looking for damages?

—

an order explaining to Ms. Brown that she

11

can't use her home for the short-term rentals that she's using

12

it for , and then we're looking for the attorney's fees that

13

we' ve incurred pur suant to CC&R's.

14

THE COURT : Okay.

15

MR. LEE: Let me see if I can help the Court

16

THE COURT : Please, and let me just save a little bit

—

17

of time, if .E can, because Ms. Brown, Mr. Lee just mentioned

18

this is a contract ; and it is, the normal contract principals

19

apply.

20

really are not at issue.

21

what the obi igation of the parties are, because it is a

22

contra ct thait binds everybody.

23

Certainly the constitutional arguments, et cetera,
What's at issue is what's meant and

So let's keep on that.

MR. LEE: Thank you, your Honor.

As I was thinking

24

about the language that the Court has identified, nightly

25

rental or similar use, I was —

I tried to get a sense of

-71

what was intended

by the language.

2

sort of a business or commercial use, and it's distinguished

3

from a residential use.

4

business issue a little bit more, because I think there's a

5

clear distinction drawn in the CC&R's

6

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

7

MR. LEE: —

What first came to mind is

I'll get into the residential versus

—

too, but the wording, to me, connotes sort

8

of a business or commercial use, and a prohibition against that

9

kind of use, which brought to mind the possibility that if this

10

is in fact a business kind of use, what does Summit County

11

require regarding nightly rentals.

12

the City, whatever government jurisdiction that is in charge,

13

requires licensing for businesses.

Typically the County or

14

So I just this afternoon started digging around

15

through the Summit County ordinances, and I found what I

16

believe are a couple of ordinances which apply here.

17

Court knows, based on our brief, that the CC&R's obligate

18

owners to —

19

County ordinances can be allowed in a subdivision.

20

in the CC&R's.

let me back up.

The

No use prohibited by Summit
That's

21

THE COURT: S u r e .

22

MR. LEE: I t ' s one of t h e i s s u e s we r a i s e i n a l i t t l e

23

different

c o n t e x t i n the b r i e f .

If I may approach, your Honor?

24

THE COURT: You may.

25

MS. BROWN: And y o u r Honor,

I'm going t o o b j e c t t o

the

1

use of this.

I haven't seen it.

I don't know what context

—

2

THE COURT: Well --

3

MS. BROWN: —

it comes from --

4

THE COURT: —

let's look at it

5

MS. BROWN: —

and it obviously hasn't been addressed.

6

THE COURT: —

because if it's -- if it's a local law,

—

7

I have to take judicial notice of it, and we're all bound by

8

it; but how I'll use it if at all, I really can't decide until

9

we see what it is.

So let's do that.

10

MR. LEE: And your Honor, this is, as you can see, it'

11

an ordinance providing for business licenses in Summit County.

12

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

13

MR. LEE: It's really just the definitions section

14

THE COURT: Yeah.

15

MR. LEE: —

16

—

of this ordinance; and if the Court will

turn to the second page --

17

THE COURT: Yeah.

18

MR. LEE: —

there's a definition for "nightly lodging

19

facility," not completely on all squares with the language we

20

have here, but it reads, "Nightly lodging facility means any

21

place or a portion thereof that is rented or otherwise made

22

available to persons for transient lodging purposes for a

23

period of less than 30 days, including without limitation

24

and then they go on and

25

—

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

—"
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MR. LEE: —

describe the kinds of lodging facilities—

2

THE COURT: Sure.

3

MR. LEE: -- including single family residence.

So

4

Summit County defines nightly lodging, including lodging in

5

single family residence as anything less than 30 days.

6

THE COURT: Which is not a definition I would have

7

expected, in all candor.

I mean, it's what it is, but it

8

and Ms. Brown -- but the point is, this is just like a State

9

statute, only it's a County version.

You understand that?

10

MS. BROWN: I understand that, your Honor.

11

THE COURT: Whether it applies here, I think it's

12
13

—

evidence of what one might consider.
MS. BROWN: Well, it's —

I'm just looking at the

14

definition section here; and it's talking about engaging in

15

business.

16

fall within any of the definitions of

That's what this applies to.

I'm —

and I do not

—

17

THE COURT: Well, that's one of the issues

—

18

MS. BROWN: —

engaging in business.

19

THE COURT: —

Mr. Lee is raising, by the activities

20

that you may or may not be engaged in; and that's something I

21

haven't determined.

22

of your points?

You may be doing business.

Isn't that one

23

MR. LEE: That is exactly my point, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Yeah.

25

MR. LEE: That is exactly my point; and the licensing
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statute draws the line in a place that I think it makes sense.

2

The distinction between a three or four or seven night renter,

3

on the one hand, and a monthly renter, on the other hand, is

4

I think the difference between a customer —

5

transient, as the statute —

6

and a resident.

somebody who's

or as the ordinance indicates,

7

At a minimum, if somebody is staying in a house for

8

30 days, or is a month-to-month tenant, I think the sense is

9

that person is residing in that house.

If a person is staying

10

there for three or four or seven days, as Ms. Brown allows in

11

her house, I think the sense is that person is a customer, a

12

lodging guest, a paying customer for a transient purpose.

13

think that's the distinction.

14

residential distinction that I'm talking about.

15

the distinction that the ordinance is trying to draw.

16

I

That's the commercial versus
I think it's

That gets us, your Honor, to the context in which this

17

language is found.

It's the context of the CC&R's; and we've

18

already gone over to some extent, but I think

19

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20

MR. LEE: —

—

in our brief we've made clear that the

21

objective of the CC&R's is to create a residential subdivision.

22

Only allowed use is single family residential use.

23

or business purposes are expressly prohibited.

24

create a context for understanding the meaning of nightly

25

rental or similar use.

Commercial

So the CC&R's

-111 I

Again, the Court will have to -- this is the legal

2

question that the Court is facing in this case, what does it

3

mean?

4

be read as a whole

The Court knows that the law is that the CC&R's need to
—

5

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

6

MR. LEE: —

and the meaning of this language, to

7

the extent it's not clear standing alone, needs to be read

8

in context —

9

here is residential, not business; and this is a business

needs to be understood in context.

She lives and works in California.

Context

10

for Ms. Brown.

This is

11

an income property for her.

12

She apparently uses it herself.

13

herself, but there's no doubt about the fact that she generates

14

business income from this property.

She advertises it for rent.
She and her family uses it

15

THE COURT: Is it your position that it really doesn't

16

matter what percentage of personal use versus business use, if

17

at any level it's business use?

18

mean, if it fits within the prohibition, it fits within —

19

if it was one month a year it happened?

20

That would be a violation?

I
even

MR. LEE: I would say it doesn't make a difference in

21

terms of the language of the CC&R's.

It may make a difference

22

to the Association in terms of practical enforcement issues.

23

THE COURT: I see.

24

MS. LEE: If she's not doing it much, then there may

25

not be a problem.

This has been a problem.

It's been a

-121

problem for a number of years.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. LEE: And it came to light, your Honor, when one

4

of the renters using the house gave us these house rules we've

5

attached to our brief.

6

to look at those.

I don't know if the Court had a chance

7

THE COURT: Yeah, uh-huh.

8

MR. LEE: Ms. Brown says they're outdated, but she

9

acknowledges that they were in place at some point.

She

10

doesn't tell us what the current house rules are; but the

11

house rules that we do have demonstrate that Ms. Brown herself

12

recognizes the distinction that I'm trying to make here.

13

The house rules say the neighbors are long-term,

14

full-time residence.

15

not.

16

time residence.

The implication, of course, is, you're

You're renting my house.

You're not a long-term, full-

Her customers are short-term renters.

17

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

18

MR. LEE: She knows that what she has done is wrong;

19

and as a consequence, she puts in the house rules, "Do not

20

disclose that you are renting this house."

21
22

THE COURT: And that's not necessarily the current one,
because you don't know, but it's in the ones you have.

23

MR. LEE: We don't know.

24

THE COURT: Yeah.

25

MR. LEE: —

She hasn't

—

she hasn't shown us what the current

-131

one is.

2

impression, your Honor, from the CC&R, as taken as a whole,

3

is single families residing in their houses are allowed in

4

this subdivision.

5

but single families residing in their houses is not allowed.

6

So taken as a whole, the overriding impression is one I think

7

that supports our position.

8
9

It may have the same language.

The overriding

Business uses, commercial uses, anything

There are other contexts that also —
which this language needs to be viewed.

contexts in

One is the County

10

ordinances and codes, one of which I just handed you.

The

11

other of which is the one that we referred to in our brief,

12

the one that precludes this kind of lodging use in this

13

particular zone.

14

compliance with zoning requirements.

15

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

16

MR. LEE: And in the final context, of course, is the

As the Court knows, the CC&R's insist on

17

context on the ground.

The real world context or context in

18

which these people live every day.

19

family —

That is a context of a

single family residential subdivision.

20

Just a few more points, and then I'll sit down.

21

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

22

MR. LEE: The —

23

THE COURT: You may.

24

MR. LEE: This is just something I pulled off the

25

if I may approach, your Honor?

Internet also this afternoon.

This is not, obviously, binding

-141

on the Court. This is just a Park City municipal code provision

2

that defines nightly lodging facility in the exact way that the

3

County defines it; and then it talks about nightly rental

4

licenses.

5

home, and that's something

6
7

We don't know if Ms. Brown has a license for this
—

THE COURT: But does the County have such a requirement?
This isn't a County —

this isn't a City

8

MR. LEE: This is a City.

9

THE COURT: Yeah.

10

MR. LEE: —

11

THE COURT: Yeah.

12

MR. LEE: —

—

This is a City

but this ordinance

—

—

is a County licensing ordinance; and one

13

of the questions that we will be asking Ms. Brown if we do not

14

prevail on summary judgment is does she have a license.

15

does then she's m

violation of the licensing

16

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

17

MR. LEE: —

ordinance.

If she

—

It's not directly relevant,

18

but if she does have a license, then she has it under this

19

nightly rental provision.

20

One more point, your Honor.

Then I'll sit down.

The

21

distinction that Ms. Brown is trying to draw is a distinction

22

between one day and more than one day.

23

MR. LEE: Uh-huh.

24

THE COURT: Under her definition, according to her,

25

this is a meaningful distinction.

She says one night is

-151

prohibited, because, quote, "nightly rentals means one night,

2

but two is okay."

3

is meaningful, how there's a meaningful distinction between

4

one night and two nights escapes me, and I assume it escapes

5

the Court as well.

6

context.

7

We're talking about a transient lodging customer.

That's her position.

That distinction is meaningless in this

Either way we're still talking about the same thing.

8

Unless the Court has questions

9

THE COURT: Not at this point.

10

MR. LEE: Thank you.

11

THE COURT: Either —

12

How that distinction

—

wherever you're comfortable.

There or at the lectern is fine.

13

MS. BROWN: Well, for the record, I have never made

14

any allegation.

It is nowhere, anyplace that there's a

15

distinction that I do one and two nights, as any sort of

16

meaningful distinction.

17

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

18

MS. BROWN: The CC&R's provide for nightly rentals.

I

19

don't rent my home on a nightly basis ever.

Never have, never

20

will.

21

calendar to suggest that I rented my home for periods of less

22

than a week.

23

Counsel with my plane tickets showing that all of those usages

24

were me at the house, with my family, celebrating things like

25

Thanksgiving, and any other three-day weekend.

The plaintiffs, in their moving papers, used an online

In fact, I provided the Court and opposing

-161

In addition, I have friend —

I have friends and

2

family who live throughout the United States, who come and

3

use my home with my permission.

4

do that.

5

welcome to come to my house --

They do not pay me money to

They are my friends, they are my family, and they are

6

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

7

MS. BROWN: —

any time they want, and use it.

8

rent my house out about —

9

the year during ski season.

I

in a good year, six weeks out of
There have been years when I have

10

not rented it at all, not once.

11

coming, when they're coming, if they're people I trust, if

12

they're people I know through a contact of mine or not.

13

—

14

It's all dependent on who's

It's

I don't have -THE COURT: But you've been candid in your papers.

15

think you've been candid with the Court now.

16

you rent it.

I

There are times

17

MS. BROWN: Yes, absolutely.

18

THE COURT: And this six weeks is not six consecutive

19

weeks to one renter?

20

MS. BROWN: No, it's not, no.

21

THE COURT: Uh-huh, and that's the question, whether

22

that does in fact put you in violation under the CC&R's.

23

mean, they're asking you to stop doing it.

24

injunctive relief means.

25

damages because you did it," and I —

I

That's what

So they're not saying, "Pay us
I've had a very busy
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2

asking for.

I should have.

3

So I'd have to say to you, in all candor, it would

4

appear that if you are renting it for periods that are less

5

than 30 days, under some of the things supplied to me now,

6

and some general readings, it may be injunctive relief is

7

justified.

8
9

Why would it not be?

MS. BROWN: I don't see that it is.

I've read the

CC&R's myself.

10

THE COURT: Okay.

11

MS. BROWN: I've asked for all documentation that

12

demonstrates what the interpretation of "nightly" is.

I've

13

been provided by nothing from the Homeowners Association saying

14

what "nightly" is, other than the term used in the CC&R's.

15

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

16

MS. BROWN: There's nothing that precludes weekly

17

rentals. In fact, many of the —

18

they allow people, owners of property, to rent their places for

19

a week at a time.

20

most of the zoning ordinances,

Nightly rentals are not allowed.

THE COURT: But are you making a distinction here

21

between a business use and a residential?

22

plenty of short-stay business in this community.

23

you're right, but it does depend on where you are.

24

change everything, because they're the contract.

25

MS. BROWN: Right.

Because there is
Of course
CC&R's
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THE COURT: The only role the ordinances have —

well,

2

to some degree they're incorporated; but secondly, they also

3

inform us as to meaning.

4

to that you think would support what you're doing, if any?

5
6

Which ordinances are you referring

MS. BROWN: I haven't looked at ordinances, because I
have gone by the CC&R's.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MS. BROWN: The CC&R's preclude nightly rentals, and

9
10

they specifically ban time shares.

We don't have either of

those situations here.

11

THE COURT: And similar.

12

MS. BROWN: It doesn't say

13

THE COURT: They use the word "similar," and I agree

14

it's a pretty weasley word.

15

words.

16

—

At least it's not my favorite

MS. BROWN: And what's very concerning to me, your

17

Honor, is it seems that the Homeowners Association just willy-

18

nilly interprets these terms how they want to.

19

the allegation was that I was doing nightly rentals.

20

the allegation changed to short-term rentals.

21

nothing about short-term rentals.

22

the

At one time
Then

Well, there's

They ignore the fact that

—

23

THE COURT: Not unless it fits in similar, it said.

24

MS. BROWN: That the —

25

isn't anything

—

well, what is "similar"?

There
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THE COURT: Uh-huh.

2

MS. BROWN: —

that defines that.

There's also the

3

provision in the CC&R's, which I've pointed out, that says

4

occasionally —

5

out.

6

on any

you're allowed occasionally to rent your house

That's specifically allowed.

I certainly don't do it

—

7

THE COURT: Which provision are you referring to now?

8

MS. BROWN: Let me find it, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Yes, please.

10

(Cough).

MS. BROWN: There isn't any claim that I do this

11

well, at least —

12

an occasional basis.

—

yeah, I don't do it on a regular basis.

13

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

14

MS. BROWN: Let me find this.

15

Excuse me.

It's

It's in my opposing

papers.

16

MR. LEE: It's Section 16 in Article 10, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Oh.

18

MS. BROWN: Thank you.

19

THE COURT: Thank you.

20

MS. LEE: Under business uses.

21

THE COURT: Yeah.

22

MS. BROWN: Okay, so anyway, even if you want to

23

construe it as a business use, it is something that would be

24

authorized in that context.

25

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, that's my question for you,
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Ms. Brown.

2

term, as opposed to just renting your property to somebody on a

3

regular tenancy, why isn't it a business use?

4

If you're renting it for money for relatively short

MS. BROWN: Well, it's my home.

So I —

you know,

5

people frequently rent out their homes, their summer homes,

6

their vacation homes.

7

THE COURT: Yeah.

8

MS. BROWN: I'm not sure that that's considered a

9
10

business use.

That's something

—

THE COURT: It is up here.

I mean, this is a resort

11

community, and some areas allow short term, some do not.

12

very clearly delineated, and I'll tell you, Summit County and

13

its business licensing requirements, they take that pretty

14

seriously, too.

15

uses as it says, "use exclusively for single family residential

16

living purposes.

17

commercial or business purpose."

18

If there's something that —

It's

the business

Shall never be occupied or used for any

Now, I can see where you're saying, "I'm not running a

19

store out of the house."

"I'm not renting snowmobiles out of

20

the house," and of course you're not; but the trouble is we get

21

back to what is designated business, or fitting it within a

22

MS. BROWN: Your Honor

23

THE COURT: —

—

—

an area requiring a business license in

24

this County.

It seems to me like whether you intended to or

25

not, you might be falling into that.
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THE COURT: Well, your Honor, specifically the CC&R

2

is the provision that we're looking at right now, says that

3

the occasional rental of your property does not constitute a

4

precluded business use.

5

extent.

6
7

So there isn't a violation to that

THE COURT: Well, rent or lease, exactly, residential
building from time to time.

8

MS. BROWN: Right.

9

THE COURT: But you have to read it in its entirety,

10

and it has to be consistent with (2)(a), that it's not short-

11

term.

12

not prohibited -- it's not just owner occupied.

13

it's not; but that doesn't mean you can then switch to the

14

other end of the spectrum, and start doing this short-term

15

business.

So yeah, of course you can lease it.

16

I mean, you're
Of course

Even though you're not doing it a lot.
MS. BROWN: Your Honor, "short term" is nowhere in the

17

CC&R's.

That appears for the first time in this argument and

18

in the reply papers.

19

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

20

MS. BROWN: It's "nightly," not "short term."

21

THE COURT: It's "nightly" or "similar;" and the

22

similar does have meaning, and again, reading it m

23

entirety.

24
25

its

The other way to reason, I think sometimes is by
reasoning from the opposite.

I think one thing that's very
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clear from these CC&R's is this is a residential community.

2

MS. BROWN: Absolutely.

3

THE COURT: And so the problem is, if your use switches

4

from residential to business or commercial in any sense, that

5

raises a red flag that you're in violation of the CC&R's.

6

your own statements —

7

totally candid.

8

rented for up to six weeks," but if it was two weeks, you may

9

well be m

10

Even

and again, as I say, I think you've been

I mean, you say that —

you're saying, "I have

violation.

You said you've never said there's a distinction

11

between one and two days or one and two nights.

12

that was inferred from your email.

13

people for a night, nightly rental?" and it's a "No, never have

14

and never will."

15

less than 48 hours?"

16

Answer, "No, never have, never will."

17

I think maybe

"Do I rent my house to

"Do I rent my house to people for periods of
A big stretch of the nightly theme.

I would read that, in all candor, as saying you're

18

trying to distinguish between a day and less than two days, or

19

less than 24 hours.

20

are too narrowly construing "nightly."

21

only one night.

22

whether it's a week or two weeks; and apparently, under the

23

ordinance, less than 30.

24
25

That was your language; but I think you
Nightly doesn't mean

It means that it's sort of measured by nights,

MS. BROWN: Well, but that ordinance isn't incorporated
in here anyplace, nor has it —

I have no idea what the context
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of that

2

—
THE COURT: I'm going to ask Mr. Lee what the zoning

3

ordinances are.

4

general incorporation of being in compliance with Summit County

5

ordinances, that you recall?

6

would take me a minute to do that.

7

This is a business ordinance.

It's a very

I haven't looked for it.

It

MR. LEE: It would take me a minutes as well, your

8

Honor.

I believe the provision in the CC&R's refers to zoning

9

ordinances.

10

THE COURT: It does on the 10-1.

11

MR. LEE: That's right.

12

THE COURT: Yeah.

13

MR. LEE: I don't believe there's a

14

THE COURT: But generally to be in compliant use of

—

15

any property, you've got to be in compliance with the County

16

ordinances and State statutes.

17

I don't know if that was intended to be or not.

18

looked at it, Ms. Brown, and tried to tell if they have —

19

incorporate all ordinances?

20
21
22
23

That's just part of the deal.
Have you
did

MS. BROWN: I have no idea what the City ordinances
are.
THE COURT: This is actually County.

You're not in the

City, right?

24

MS. BROWN: No.

25

THE COURT: You're in the Jeremy Ranch area?
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MS. BROWN: I'm in Summit County.

2

THE COURT: Yeah, exactly.

So —

but the County

3

ordinance may be incorporated, it may not on this ordinance,

4

but it's certainly of some substantial weight, in my mind, in

5

determining what "nightly" means, which is just one of the

6

terms at issue here.

7

it.

8

haven't done that.

9

I don't see how the time share fits into

Again, I think that would be about selling units; and you

MS. BROWN: No.

10

THE COURT: So I don't think you're in violation of

11

that.

Nightly rental or similar use, gosh, I mean, I read this

12

with interest when it was filed.

13

last night, and then it was just today after some hearings I

14

looked again at the CC&R's, and had the concern I had about

15

ambiguity, but

I read —

re-read it again

—

16

MS. BROWN: Your Honor

17

THE COURT: —

—

looking at it in its entirety, it seems

18

to me that the specific uses to which you have been putting it

19

are problematic.

20

MS. BROWN: I think —

21

THE COURT: Yeah.

22

MS. BROWN: No doubt.

I think there's a question here.

I have not had the time or the

23

inclination to research what the County ordinances are, because

24

it's not something that we have been discussing in this lawsuit

25

at all. I think your concern at the very outset of this hearing
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is a very va lid one.

2

means.

3

ought to be looking at in these CC&R's.

4

It's there is confusion over what this

For that reason, I think that's another thing that we

One of the provisions here is that this is —

these

5

matters are not supposed to be coming directly to the Court.

6

Arbitration is mandated.

7

the homeowners

There has never been any attempt by

—

8

THE COURT: Well, let me ask, did you demand

—

9

MS. BROWN: —

homeowners to

10

THE COURT: —

arbitration?

11

MS. BROWN: —

do that.

12

THE COURT: I did see an arbitration.

13

MS. BROWN: As troublesome

14

THE COURT: What section is it; do you remember?

15

MS. BROWN: —

16

THE COURT: Oh, 12.

17

MR. LEE: Yes, 12, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

MS. BROWN: As troublesome as this issue seems to be

—

Didn't read it.

—

as troublesome —

yes, it's Article 12.

20

for everybody, I think this is one that is appropriate for

21

arbitration, especially if we want to find out what impact

22

the ordinances have, depending on interpreting the plain

23

language of the CCR, or

—

24

THE COURT: Well, here's the problem.

25

MS. BROWN: —

the ambiguity.
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2

THE COURT: You clearly are not ignorant of the law,
but I don't know if you're law trained.

Are you?

3

MS. BROWN: Yes.

4

THE COURT: You are?

5

MS. BROWN: Uh-huh.

6

THE COURT: Do you have a degree?

7

MS. BROWN: Yes, I do.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

You perhaps haven't spent the time I

have on arbitration in this state, and you perhaps haven't been

10

both reversed and affirmed as much as I have on arbitration in

11

this state; but the leading cases in this case —

12

that issue, in Chandler vs. Mass Mutual, Park West vs. Central

13

Florida, and Smile vs. Bright Smile.

14

was out of my office when I was a lawyer.

15

it, but I did a lot of work on it; and the other two were my

16

cases.

17

state on

Chandler vs. Mass Mutual
My partners handled

We definitely favor arbitration and mediation

18

provisions in this state.

19

and Smile vs. Bright Smile go to the issue of whether someone

20

waives their right to demand arbitration.

21

to have waived it if you participate meaningfully in the

22

litigation without demanding the right to arbitrate.

23
24
25

Both Central Florida vs. Park West

You're considered

One of the places you have to start is in the answer.
In your answer did you demand arbitration?
MS. BROWN: Well, I didn't specifically say I demand
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arbitration.

What I raised as an affirmative defense is

2

failure to satisfy a condition precedent to asserting the

3

claims.

4

THE COURT: Okay, I see how you brought that

5

MS. BROWN: Is the affirmative defense.

6

THE COURT: —

and the other thing is, to participate

7

in motions creates problems for you.

8

Let's have a look.

9
10

—

Here's your answer.

MS. BROWN: And I also have briefed that issue a number
of times in correspondence with plaintiff's Counsel.

11

THE COURT: That's important.

Then we do have an

12

issue, because what you should do —

or should have done, is

13

file a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding,

14

or dismiss the proceeding, depending on the nature of the

15

provision.

16

the Court, but the rules are pretty clear about the way it

17

works.

18

condition precedent; and you say you've raised it in

I mean, I don't care if it's arbitrated or before

Condition precedent.

I suppose in a sense that is a
—

19

MS. BROWN: It's

20

THE COURT: —

correspondence?

21

MS. BROWN: —

it's been raised in correspondence.

22
23

—

It's also raised in my responses to discovery.
THE COURT: I see.

Well, I'm going to be asking

24

Mr. Lee to respond on the issue, the impact, if any, of the

25

arbitration provision at this stage of the proceeding.

If I
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was to grant the motion, it would be an interesting problem,

2

because you haven't made your motion to compel arbitration.

3

Whether you waived it or not, I can't determine at this time,

4

without understanding everything you've done; but I can assure

5

you the case law gives us plenty of guidance on it.

6

The last time I found waiver, I was affirmed.

So I

7

feel better about that one.

8

waiver, and the Court —

9

didn't agree with me on not compelling arbitration, and it was

10

the worst arbitration agreement you've ever seen in your life.

11

Both of those happened in this courthouse —

12

did.

13

In Park West, I found there wasn't

Supreme Court agreed with me; but they

no, one of them

The thing is, whether we grant summary judgment today

14

or not; and I find it right now to be a very close call.

If I

15

did not, the question is, is there room yet to deal with the

16

arbitration provision?

17

as I say, my sense was that you had at least training in the

18

law.

19

standard.

What you really need to address -- and

I didn't know how much you did —

the summary judgment

20

What genuine disputed material fact do you identify?

21

I know there's the issue of meaning; but I'm not sure that we

22

haven't gotten around that concern.

23

the most critical material disputed facts that would prevent

24

summary judgment?

25

What do you think are

MS. BROWN: Well, they have introduced no evidence of
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what sort of rental activity is going on at that -- at my

2

property, other than what I have said, which is, I occasionally

3

rent it on a weekly basis.

4

THE COURT: Well, you —

as I say, you've answered the

5

questions; and that's to your credit.

6

advertising, which sort of suggests a business activity;

7

wouldn't you agree?

Whether it worked or not, I don't know.

8

MS. BROWN: I don't know.

9 I owner.

So I haven't

10
11

There is the website

It's vacation rentals by

—

THE COURT: Yeah, that sure sounds like business to me,
Ms. Brown.

12

MS. BROWN: Well

—

13

THE COURT: So they've got that evidence.

They've got

14

your house rules, which m

15

concern about how it was construed by neighbors, but I can read

16

that two ways.

17

doing business; and two, you just don't want to upset the

18

neighborhood.

19

all candor suggests that you have

One, you try to avoid someone knowing you're

MS. BROWN: Yeah, the —

you know, the first time I

20

had guests at my house, you know, Sherry West, the neighbor

21

across the street came over and told me that there's no nightly

22

rentals.

23

rentals mean, you know, I just listened

Rather than have a discussion about what nightly

24

THE COURT: Yeah.

25

MS. BROWN: —

—

and left it at that.
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THE COURT: And if every instance was you having

2

guests, I don't care how big your family is, I don't think

3

you're violating anything.

4

and rent it to somebody else.

5

term, which would normally be month-to-month.

6

step into the possibility of a commercial activity that would

7

violate.

8
9

That's —

for less than a lease
Then I think we

Okay, what other specific disputes do you think would
bar summary judgment?

10
11

It's when you step over the line

MS. BROWN: Well, I have some questions about this is a
matter that's even appropriate for injunctive relief.

12

THE COURT: Why is that?

13

MS. BROWN: What —

how in the world do you enforce

14

something like this?

Is -- you know, is it a business use if

15

I rent my house out once or twice a week?

16

the tax codes, no.

I wouldn't have to

17

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

18

MS. BROWN: —

Well, if you look at

—

claim that as business income of any

19

sort.

If Sherry West has a concern anytime she sees somebody

20

besides me at my house, does that give her the right, or the

21

homeowners a right to come into Court and say, "I suspect that

22

Lisa's renting her house"?

23

here is suspicious, not —

I mean, a lot of what's going on
is suspicion, not fact based at all.

24

THE COURT: In terms of how you would enforce it, the

25

injunction would have to be written with certain specificity.
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It would have to prohibit —

2

the Court's interpretation, what is prohibited by the CC&R's,

3

specifically put that in the injunction.

4

number of days.

5

Then I think it would be clear to everybody, which would be a

6

good thing going forward.

7

we would have to define, from

It would talk about

It would talk about a business type activity.

I don't know, Ms. Brown, if you're here today saying

8

you feel you have a right to retain the option to rent for

9

less than 30 days.

If you're saying that, I think you've got

10

a problem again.

I don't know if you're concerned about the

11

future.

12

an issue there, and we can make that clear; but if you have

13

an issue where you want to bring in people for profit, which

14

is what those rentals are, then that's the core of the suit,

15

isn't it?

Not about your family and friends.

16

You don't have

MS. BROWN: It could be a concern; but then again, I

17

look —

see, I look at the whole meaning of the CC&R's.

as I

18

said m

one of my emails, I understand the concern if you have

19

a bunch of strangers running around m

20

nightly basis or just all the time random people.

the neighborhood on a

21

THE COURT: Yeah, but now you're talking of policy.

22

I understood that, but it doesn't really matter what's good

23

policy if the contract says X, because you're bound by the

24

contract.

25

binds you.

When you buy into that neighborhood, the contract
Even if the use prohibited by the CC&R's does not
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create that kind of annoyance or degradation of the neighbor-

2

hood, it doesn't mean you can do it.

3

MS. BROWN: Yeah, and I agree with that

4

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

5

MS. BROWN: —

6

—

but I think the CC&R's are very unclear

as to what you can do.

That term

—

7

THE COURT: Which is why injunctive relief and the

8

Court's determination and meaning would be what would bind

9

you prospectively because I agree, to the extent there's

10

unclearness, that needs to be addressed.

I'm less concerned

11

about unclearness now than I was when I walked m

12

all candor.

the door, in

13

MS. BROWN: Well

—

14

THE COURT: I mean, that's why we have argument.

15

MS. BROWN: Exactly.

16

THE COURT: Yeah.

17

MS. BROWN: And that's why you have arbitration, and

18

that's why you have neighborhood talking before you go out and

19

file a lawsuit, which was also something that's supposed to

20

happen here.

21

THE COURT: Well, that's a better thing, but you know,

22

my 30b is to sit here and put on this robe and decide it if you

23

didn't talk.

That's just what I do.

24

MS. BROWN: I understand that.

25

THE COURT: Yeah, but the arbitration issue we're
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going to have to talk about, but we're here today on summary

2

judgment ; and I have to make a principal decision on whether

3

I grant or deny it.

4

that

So I want you to address every issue there

—
MS. BROWN: Okay.

5

You know, as I said, there

— the

6

evidence that they have submitted, in terms of whLether I rent

7

my home on a weekly basis or any other basis is m s u f f i c i ent.

8

THE COURT: Even your own admissions?

9

MS . BROWN: Well., my admissions here roaa y that I rent

10

it out on

—
THE COURT: No, I don't mean just today.

11

I mean,

12

in your answers to request for admissions, you ma de some

13

objections, but ult imatesly —

14

was No. 5

was it was No. 5?

I think it

—

15

MS. BROWN: I'm talking about the rental calendar •

16

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

17

MS. BROWN: So that's not admissible eviclence.

18

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

19

MS. BROWN: You know, the evidence about my

20

THE COURT: But we don't need everything.

—
Don't you

21

think

22

I deem t o be prohib ited —

23

activity under 30 days --- one instance is enough to grant the

24

injunction?

25

m this case if I find any instance of you doing what

MS. BROWN: No.

that is, some kind of commercial
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THE COURT: Why not?

2

MS. BROWN: Because under the law, a weekly -- renting

3

your home for a week is not a business use.

4

THE COURT: No, that's changing the hypothetical.

5

MS. BROWN: I'm sorry.

6

THE COURT: Is that —

no, maybe that's even badly

7

said.

If I determine that anything you have done even on

8

one occasion violates the law as I interpret as a Court --

9 J obviously subject to appeal, and I have the greatest respect
10

for people who try to appeal my decisions —

but if I determine

11

that a week or less or two weeks is still in violation and

12

happened one time, doesn't that support an injunction?

13

MS. BROWN: I am not sure that you can get injunctive

14

relief where you have an ambiguous provision that needs to be

15

defined.

16

THE COURT: But again, you're changing it.

I'm saying

17

I've gotten past ambiguity, found a determination, defined it

18

as X, and found that you have violated it once.

19

have to go through those steps.

Obviously we

20

MS. BROWN: Yeah, that's

21

THE COURT: Yeah.

22

MS. BROWN: If we had a definition, if we had something

23

concrete here, if we had a definition, and you found that I had

24

violated

25

—
THE COURT: Uh-huh.

—
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2

MS. BROWN: —

rental terms r for instance

3
4

the daily —

the daily —

—

THE COURT: Or the "similar."
there

no nightly

I mean, that word's in

We can't ignore it.

5

MS. BROWN: —

6

THE COURT: Yeah, so if we

7

MS. BROWN: If you found that - -

8

THE COURT: —

if you violated nightly or similar.

9

MS. BROWN: —

if you found tha t, you could order

if you -- right.
—

10

injunctive relief.

11

ments of injunctive relief is enforceab llity.

12

you could issue an injunction, and you could define

I think one of the —

one of the reguireYou're saying
—

13

THE COURT: We would have to be very specific

14

MS. BROWN: —

what the CC&R's mean

15

THE COURT: —

in the definitions, correct, uh-huh.

16

MS. BROWN: —

but then how do you enforce that?

17
18

Because

—

—

—
THE COURT: Well, the enforcement mechanism is an

19

order to show cause , why you should not be held in contempt

20

for violating the C ourt's order, or for damages.

21

enforcement mechani sm; but I'm assuming that once we define it,

22

you' d follow it

— the order.

23

MS. BROWN: Absolutely.

24

THE COURT: Yeah.

25

MS. BROWN: But I think what you need

—

That's the
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2

THE COURT: I mean, this isn't your prime business
source of income.

I didn't think for a moment it was.

3

MS. BROWN: No.

4

THE COURT: If it was, you wouldn't be doing very well.

5

Not at six weeks on a good year.

6

didn't see the problem with it.

7
8

Okay, so enforceability, I

MS. BROWN: I just foresee anytime a neighbor sees
somebody she doesn't know in the neighborhood

9

—

THE COURT: Yeah.

10

MS. BROWN: —

11

THE COURT: I guess, I mean

12

MS. BROWN: —

here we go to Court again.

13

THE COURT: —

it could be a source of mischief, is

14

and has a public fit

—

—

what you're saying.

15

MS. BROWN: Yes, exactly.

16

THE COURT: And it could be; but that comes down to

17

another issue for another day, I think.

18

attacks you, then I think you're the one with the action, not

19

one —

20

that's all about litigation.

21

If someone frivolously

I mean, as you said, you don't want a neighborhood

MS. BROWN: Well, your Honor, and quite frankly, if we

22

were headed off to arbitration on this, I don't think we even

23

go through an arbitration, because my position would be if me

24

renting my home, getting money for people coming to stay at my

25

house for a week during ski season is a big problem for you,
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Homeowners Association, then I won't do it; but for me to pay

2

attorney's fees because somebody -- because there's a vague

3

provision

—

4

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

5

MS. BROWN: —

6

different ways, even in this single proceeding, that's wrong.

7
8

that they choose to interpret many, many

THE COURT: It's really a different issue, though,
isn't it?

9

MS. BROWN: Well, the Court's always

—

10

THE COURT: And whether it's arbitration or

11

MS. BROWN: —

(inaudible) equitable.

12

THE COURT: —

or the courtroom, an arbitrator decides

13

the issue just like I would.

14

MS. BROWN: Absolutely, but

15

THE COURT: Yeah.

16

MS. BROWN: —

17

THE COURT: And they could award —

18

—

what I'm saying is

—
an arbitrator could

award fees, right?

19
20

—

MS. BROWN: Well, what I'm saying is there would be a
compromise, and that's the whole purpose of

21

—

THE COURT: Well, that would be more like a mediation,

22

I think.

Mr. Lee, is it arbitration and/or mediation, or is it

23

mediation then arbitration, the language?

24

MR. LEE: There is no required mediation, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: There is not?
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MR. LEE: There i s a c o n d i t i o n — t h e r e i s

2

THE COURT: So i s t h e r e an a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n ?

3
4

MR. LEE: Says, "Any controversy, claim or dispute
arising out of this CC&R is essentially —

6

arbitration."

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

I

t h i n k I saw one, but —

5

7

not.

shall be settled by

THE COURT: Okay, yeah, Article 12.
would be, when you get up again, not just yet

So the question
—

MR. LEE: Yeah.
THE COURT: —

whether that is still a requirement.

problem is there's been no motion.
MR. LEE: That's my problem as well, and I have a
couple of other problems I'd like to talk to the Court about.
THE COURT: Okay, I look forward to hearing those;

15

but you say that if there had been arbitration —

16

arbitration is a heck of a lot like Court, regardless of what

17

people say.

18

you sit down and try to reason it out and compromise, which

19

would be ideal, but it's not required by the CC&R's.

and see,

Mediation is more what you're talking about, where

20

MS. BROWN: Actually it is, your Honor.

21

THE COURT: It is?

22

MS. BROWN: That same paragraph, it says --

23

THE COURT: Okay, in 12?

24

MS. BROWN: —

25

My

involved m

Where is that?

"In the event the Association becomes

any controversy, claim or dispute, regardless of
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the cause, it shall attempt to avoid litigation by offering to

2

settle through the use of binding arbitration in accordance

3

with the Commercial Arbitration Rules," et cetera.

4

THE COURT: But it says "arbitration."

I see what you

5

mean about attempt to -- offering to settle, and I agree

6

MS. BROWN: Attempt to avoid litigation.

7

THE COURT: —

it's certainly is inconsistent with

8

arbitration, because someone decides it for you.

9

got another bit of bad language here.

10

"mediation."

11

what you're saying.

—

So we've

It should have said

I know you know the difference.

I can tell from

12

Unfortunately, as I've said, I've seen a lot worse

13

arbitration and mediation provision enforced by our Supreme

14

Court and Court of Appeals, and I think we'll see many more.

15

It is the policy of this State to favor it, unless it's waived.

16

We're here today, and I can't determine if there's a waiver,

17

but I do know I don't have a motion to send it to arbitration.

18

So it's not the issue before me.

19

MS. BROWN: Well, and if we go back to just he language,

20

what does nightly or similar use mean

21

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

22

MS. BROWN: —

—

I think that's something, too, that if

23

—

before a summary judgment should be granted or ruled upon,

24

it's something that deserves to be in front of the Court,

25

because if there's something that opposing Counsel's got
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something, I —

2

THE COURT: That brings me

—

3

MS. BROWN: —

my guess is

—

4

THE COURT: —

to the next question, though.

5

MS. BROWN: —

I could find something, too.

6

THE COURT: What is —

what could we do to make it

7

clearer?

8

"Judge, who's going to come in and testify as to intent?"

9

That's not really the issue.

10

Mr. Lee responded fairly early to my question,

The people dealing with this

now are not the people who drafted the agreement.

11

MS. BROWN: Right.

12

THE COURT: So I think you're telling me you want a

13

chance to argue it more on a legal basis; but the definition

14

is clearly before the Court today, and that should have been

15

addressed.

16

testimony, et cetera, to shed more light on the meaning?

17
18

What would you do in terms of fact discovery,

MS. BROWN: Well, what I did in terms of fact discovery
is I asked for anything that defined the term "nightly."

19

THE COURT: Yeah, my question is what would you do from

20

the —

21

What would you do?

22
23

if I denied summary judgment, you'd have more discovery.

MS. BROWN: I would ask —

I would ask them how to

—

how they interpret the --

24

THE COURT: Yeah, but they've told us in the courtroom.

25

MS. BROWN: Well, or did they —

what they've said is
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"short term."

2

hasn't ever been any definition

3

That's what their reply paper said.

There

—

THE COURT: Yeah, but again, now we're about an hour of

4

argument —

almost an hour —

5

That's what we're doing.

and that's what we're here for.

6

MS. BROWN: Yeah.

So we

7

THE COURT: So I'm saying

8

MS. BROWN: —

it's determined from the party.

9

THE COURT: —

what would we get in addition?

10

my question.

11

discovery, and trial if necessary?

—
—

That's

What could we add to this process, by going into

12

MS. BROWN: Define the term.

13

THE COURT: But no, tell me, how?

What would —

what

14

steps would we specifically take to define the term, other

15

than what you're doing?

16

it.

17

argued it by specific examples, as has Mr. Lee.

You've argued it.

I mean, you've certainly addressed
You argued it by analogy.

18

MS. BROWN: You know

19

THE COURT: So what else would you do?

20

MS. BROWN: —

21

do anything more.

22

interpretation.

—

I honestly can't say that you would

You would go to the rules of contract

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24

MS. BROWN: Define the term "ambiguous."

25

You've

You would

say there's an ambiguity there; and hopefully he would tell
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the parties to work it out, or the Court is going to have to

2

—

3

sufficient information provided of a definition of nightly

4

versus (inaudible).

have to define what it means, because there hasn't been

5

THE COURT: When you say "information," though, you

6

seem to me to only be saying, "I want you to tell me again why

7

you think this is contrary to the agreement;" but there isn't

8

any evidence.

9

earlier.

10

I guess I maybe should have used that word

What evidence would we seek?
They've already told us their argument; and this is

11

fundamentally a legal argument.

12

over the fact that you have on occasion rented it for a shorter

13

term than 30 days, I have to decide if I think that fits within

14

the definition.

15

If we don't have a dispute

So what other evidence would we look for?

MS. BROWN: We would look for similar homeowners'

16

agreements where nightly rentals are prohibited, and see if

17

those define nightly rental.

18

estate agents to find out what the meaning is in the community.

19

When —

20

you can't rent for less than four days.

21

We would maybe talk to some real

because I know there are communities around here where
So

—

THE COURT: Yeah, but they're -- but they all have

22

their own rules, and that's the point.

This is a contract

23

cause of action.

24

some information, so too might what's happening m

25

communities; but ultimately it comes down to you have a

So just like the ordinance does give us
other
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contract.

It has terms.

Is it ambiguous?

I raise the issue.

2

I'm less inclined to think it is at this point.

3

MS. BROWN: Well

—

4

THE COURT: And at least it's not so ambiguous to me,

5

that what you agree to doing does not appear to me to be in

6

violation of (2)(a).

7

about the fees issue.

8

anything as far as you wish; but say we went —

9

arbitration from here and lost, all you've got is bigger fees,

10

That's the concern I have.

You talk

Obviously you have the right to pursue
you went to

if you lost.

11

MS. BROWN: Yeah, I

12

THE COURT: If you go on in this case and you lose, you

13

have bigger fees.

14

obligation.

—

If you win, of course, you don't have a fee

If you've got a lawyer, you might get some fees.

15

MS. BROWN: Right.

16

THE COURT: Yeah, but the fees is just that monster

17

that keeps growing.

18

MS. BROWN: Yeah, and we were still —

you know, if the

19

Court —

I find the term and I find the language ambiguous.

20

It says, "Occasional rental is not a business use."

21

"Nightly rental is prohibited."

22

prohibited," and "Similar use is prohibited."

23

says.

It says,

It says, "Timeshare use is
That's all it

24

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

25

MS. BROWN: There's nothing that prohibits weekly
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rental.

2

there's nothing that allows 30 days.

3
4

THE COURT: I think my —

So

and

—

sorry, I didn't mean to cut

you off.

5
6

There's nothing that prohibits 10 days or 14 or —

MS. BROWN: —

so it is —

found to not be an ambiguous term.

7

I don't see how it can be
You have to go to outside.

THE COURT: And the reason I think it may not be, is

8

what I said a little bit earlier.

That is, looking at it more

9

within the context of the entire purpose of the CC&R's and

10

their development, or the Association in the neighborhood, and

11

that is residential versus commercial or business.

12

You look at that, and it becomes easy to see what

13

is intended by this language.

14

short-term use.

15

with that; but the commercial or business use is identified,

16

for example, in the ordinances.

17

you did was commercial.

18

You didn't think renting your house was business, but it is

19

business.

20

That is to avoid a commercial

They don't use the term "short-term," I agree

By your own admission, what

Apparently you didn't think so.

It's an income generating activity.
It doesn't mean that if your family comes in and does

21

a use with your permission and gives you some money to offset

22

the cost that that's business.

23

advertising it, which we have evidence of; when you do some

24

short-term, which you agree you have; when you have done it up

25

to six weeks in a year —

That's not; but when you start

but even if you've done it one or two
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weeks m

a year —

that sounds pretty commercial, and seems to

2

be to get beyond any concern about ambiguity.

3

MS. BROWN: I would have to say I disagree that that

4

THE COURT: I know you do.

5

MS. BROWN: -- rises to a commercial use.

6

THE COURT: Uh-huh

7

MS. BROWN: Commercial use is something, you know, I'm

8

in the business of doing something and selling something, and

9

yeah, it's not

10

—

THE COURT: You're selling nights of lodging.

Multiple

11

nights, but not renting your property like —

12

there are some gray areas here.

13

houses in Summit County, and rented them out on a six-month

14

lease, that's clearly a business; but it's also not in

15

violation of the CC&R or any others that I'm aware of.

16

MS. BROWN: And you know, if you —
profit, well, it's not for profit.

18

it.

It doesn't cover

you're right,

For example, if you own six

17

if you say it's for

I don't get a profit off of

—

19

THE COURT: The fact that one's a bad business woman

20

MS. BROWN: —

my mortgage.

21

THE COURT: —

doesn't actually change the rules, but

22

—

23

a good one; but my point is making a profit doesn't define a

24

business.

25

—

and I don't mean you're a bad business woman.

MS. BROWN: Yeah, I —

well, I agree, it's

—

I bet you're

—
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THE COURT: Yeah.

2

MS. BROWN: —

3

THE COURT: I need to hear from Mr. Lee on the effect

wouldn't be a good one.

4

of arbitration.

5

when he's done on any of these issues, but I want to hear that.

6

So why don't you take a seat for a moment, if you would.

7

Mr. Lee, I think we both know the law.

8

I will not preclude you from adding something

The question

is, where are we procedurally, and what's the impact?

9

MR. LEE: Well, I think the Court knows the law much

10

better than I know the law.

I've never been good at the

11

deciding case (inaudible), and just rattled off all of the

12

relevant ones, but

—

13

THE COURT: Learn the hard way.

14

MR. LEE: Sometimes the best way.

15

THE COURT: Yeah.

16

MR. LEE: It's clear to us, however, your Honor, that

17

the arbitration —

the right to demand arbitration has been

18

laid in this case.

19

year.

20

complete discovery. Discovery is completed under the scheduling

21

order.

We —

this case was filed in April of last

We've gone through substantial proceedings, including

22

THE COURT: It is?

I didn't look at that.

Okay.

23

MR. LEE: No more discovery can be done in this case;

24

so if the question is, what more can we do to get to this

25

issue?

The answer is nothing.
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THE COURT: Well, apparently under the time table, but

2

also I think Ms. Brown was candid when we finally got down to

3

the point, she can't identify anything to do m

discovery

—

4

MR. LEE: Yeah.

5

THE COURT: -- that would shed light.

6

MR. LEE: That's correct; and that's kind of the point

7

I'm making here

—

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. LEE: —

in the argument.

In terms of arbitration,

10

in the two years that these parties were discussing this issue

11

off and on before we filed the case, and in the year since the

12

case has been pending, arbitration has not been raised.

13

word has not been used, as far as I know.

Ms. Brown said it

14

was referenced m

I —

15

didn't see it.

16
17
18
19

responses to discovery.

frankly, I

I just looked.

THE COURT: She mentioned correspondence, too.
you

That

Did

—
MR. LEE: And I do not have my correspondence file with

me, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. LEE: But the affirmative defense she references,

22

that we haven't satisfied the conditions precedent to serving

23

our claims, is fairly vague.

24
25

It certainly doesn't reference

—

THE COURT: Well, actually, I've thought about that a
little more since I looked at it.

Arbitration is not set forth
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as a condition precedent to filing a suit.

You don't get

2

MR. LEE: That's right.

3

THE COURT: —

4

MR. LEE: That's right, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: But if you waive arbitration, then you

6

—

to file suit if you pursue arbitration.

live with that fact.

7

MR. LEE: That's right.

8

summary judgment.

9

arbitration in this case.

We're here on a motion for

There is no motion pending to compel
We've gone through the substantial

10

proceedings that the cases look at in terms of waiver; and I

11

think it's time to resolve this thing.

12
13

THE COURT: In terms of discovery, was it all paper,
interrogatories, et cetera?

14

MR. LEE: It was all paper, that's correct.

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. LEE: Ms. -- the costs in this case have been,

17

frankly, relatively low, and I think the Court makes a good

18

point; it's time to cut off those fees and move on.

19

was quite candid when she said that if the Association had come

20

to her and said, "We don't like your weekly rental," she would

21

stop it.

22

Ms. Brown

Well, they came to her three years ago, and they've

23

talked about this issue for a couple of years.

Today is the

24

first time we've heard that she would be willing to stop it;

25

and frankly it sounds like we've got a solution.

You know, the
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Court's got to issue an injunction, and I agree the injunction

2

has to be carefully crafted, to avoid the issues that Ms. Brown

3

raises, preliminary issues.

4

All we want is an injunction at this point, and the

5

attorney's fees we've incurred to get to this point.

6

under the circumstances, the Court has identified all of the

7

reasons why we're entitled to it.

Ms. Brown is a bright,

8

articulate person.

She is a -- as

I understand it, she's

9

m-house Counsel for a large international corporation.

She

10

knows the law.

11

on arbitration, had she wanted arbitration, she could have

12

compelled it.

13
14

She knows what she's doing.

I think

Had she insisted

THE COURT: Ms. Brown, anything else you wish to add on
any issue?

15

MS. BROWN: No, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: All right.

There really is a place for

17

summary judgment, and one of the most important is to avoid

18

matters going forward that only entangle people in further

19

litigation and cost.

20

if the Court does not grant summary judgment, if it is in fact

21

warranted.

22

That will very much be an outcome here

I've read this with great interest.

I believe the

23

controlling —

one controlling provision is Article 10(2)(a),

24

no timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will be allowed on

25

any single family residential lot; but also that no lot shall
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be used except for single family residential purposes.

2

Also, the overriding concern throughout the document

3

—

4

I read a little earlier —

5

in 16, I think, actually 10-16.

6

the property shall be used exclusively for single family

7

residential living purposes, shall never be occupied or used

8

for any commercial or business purpose."

9

and I won't cite a specific here, but there is language
that no business uses.

That was

Yeah, "The lands within

I agree, as I said before, Ms. Brown, the evidence

10

does not support use for a traditional business in the sense

11

of trading out of the house or any of these items you've

12

mentioned; but a business purpose, a short-term rental

13

and I know that term grates on you every time.

14

say it, I regret saying it —

15

days, which I think is the appropriate definition —

16

we need to import the ordinance definition of "nightly lodging

17

facility," which is for transient lodging purposes for a period

18

of less than 30 days, including without limitation a single

19

family residence.

20

—

Every time I

but a rental for less than 30
I think

That's what it says in 10, and that is what your home

21

is.

22

the CC&R's to not permit such use; and the undisputed facts

23

show that there have been such uses, and that it is contrary

24

to the CC&R's to have such uses in the future.

25

That was not contemplated —

well, it was contemplated by

I find there are no disputed facts that prevent the
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Court from making that determination; and in terms of the

2

arbitration, there is no motion before the Court to compel

3

arbitration and dismiss this action, which would be the

4

appropriate way to proceed, because it's not a condition

5

precedent to suit.

6

It's in lieu of suit.

I also believe that even if there was a motion before

7

the Court, participation through answering the complaint, not

8

insisting upon arbitration, participating in discovery —

9

very pleased to hear it hasn't been extensive, expensive

10

discovery.

11

that nevertheless has put both sides to some prejudice.

12

I'm

It's always expensive, as we all know as lawyers,

That's one of the standards in Smile vs. Bright

13

Smile and Mass Mutual.

14

in ordering arbitration; but as I say, most importantly, it's

15

not even before the Court.

16

arbitration provision in the agreement can be raised at this

17

point to defeat an otherwise meritorious summary judgment.

18

There is a prejudice at this point

I don't think the fact of an

So in short, I find that summary judgment should be

19

granted, and injunction should enter.

20

carefully crafted.

21

Then you will edit it.

22

provisions, it will define the terms in 2(a), as I've stated,

23

and it will talk about no business use.

24
25

It should be very

First, Mr. Lee will take a crack at it.
If you think it doesn't state the

It should also make clear that Ms. Brown is not
prohibited from allowing family, friends from using the

-521

property.

I don't know if the language here can work on

2

this, but there should be someway of addressing that it's not

3

improper to have some kind of reasonable compensation, whether

4

it's for cleaning or whatever, for people who fall within that

5

category, but that it may not -- I'm struggling with this one.

6

I'm not sure the language is going to work, Mr. Lee, because

7

we don't want to go to profit issues, because that's not the

8

issue; but there shouldn't be a prohibition, and I don't think

9

anyone in the subdivision or HOA wants to be prohibited from

10

having their family come.

11

Thanksgiving and Christmas and skiing.

12

you've got some language in mind for that.

13

People bring their families here at
So I don't know if

The main point is to separate, as you said earlier,

14

residential from business.

Family purposes, friends are not

15

the people who you get on the Internet offering short stay.

16

So got to work on that language a little.

17

MR. LEE: I'll do it.

18

THE COURT: Submit it to Ms. Brown.

19

MR. LEE: And I'll work with Ms. Brown.

20

THE COURT: On the fees, you are clearly entitled, as

21

prevailing party to fees.

You must submit an affidavit of

22

those fees at any time you wish after the order is completed.

23

Then, Ms. Brown, how long would you like to respond to the

24

pleas as in terms of necessity and reasonableness?

25

whatever you want.

You take

I want you to be able to address them; and
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I would suggest you address them under the criteria of Dixie

2

State Bank vs. Bracken.

3

MS. BROWN: Could you say that again?

4

THE COURT: Dixie State Bank vs. Bracken.

5

reasonable and what isn't.

6

it's helpful for me.

7

think.

Says what's

That's the way I analyze fees.

So

It's a fairly old case, over 20 years, I

Can you give me the cite, Mr. Lee?

8

MR. LEE: I cannot, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: There are professional responsibility

10

rules, but they're really not as important to me as the

11

controlling case.

12

Mr. Lee?

What is your hourly rate at this time,

13

MR. LEE: It is $250 an hour.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. LEE: Very reasonable.

16

THE COURT: Yeah.

One of the standards is whether

17

a lawyer's fee is reasonable for his or her experience,

18

reputation, et cetera, in the community.

19

with rates here, and $250 is well within the range.

20

California it would be a pittance, but here it's well within

21

the range.

22

time on that; but what you should analyze is whether the work

23

needed to be done, et cetera, those kinds of things.

I'm very familiar
In

It's just maybe you don't want to spend too much

24

So how long did you say you'd like to respond on that?

25

MS. BROWN: Is thirty days good?

-541 I

THE COURT: Thirty.

2

MS. BROWN: Fifteen to thirty, in that range.

3 (

THE COURT: Thirty is fine.
MS. BROWN: Okay.

5 I

MR. LEE: Thirty is.

6

THE COURT: I think you're going to take a little time.

7 J I encourage you to actually work together on the language here,
because no one wants an order that you can't all understand;
9 I but they're entitled to that order.
10

MR. LEE: I think we can do that, your Honor.

11

THE COURT: Anything else you need?

12

MR. LEE: No, thank you.

13

THE COURT: Thank you for your courtesy, and you have

14

presented it well, Ms. Brown.

15

MS. BROWN: Thank you.

16

THE COURT: Thank you.

17

MR. LEE: Thanks for coming up, your Honor.

18

(Hearing concluded)
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Exhibit D

FILED DISTRICT COURT
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY

Third Judicial District

SEP - 2 2008
SUMMll oUUNIV

By

SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation,

/hf*
deputy Clerk

m

RULING & ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 070500211
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER

vs.
LISA M. BROWN,
Defendant.

Currently before the Court is defendant Lisa Brown's "Motion to Tax Attorney Fees," filed
by Ms. Brown on July 10, 2008. In her motion, defendant challenges specific costs and fees that
plaintiff South Ridge claims entitlement to as set forth in its affidavit in support of attorney fees and
costs. Taxation generally refers only to costs, but the Court will address both costs and fees, and
defendant's concerns, regardless of terminology.
1. Costs
Costs, as referenced under Rule 54(d) are defined as "those fees which are required to be paid
to the court and to witnesses, and which the statute authorizes to be included in the judgments."
Frampton v Wilson 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). This Court has substantial discretion in
awarding costs. Some are clearly warranted costs, such as filing fees; some expenses are awarded
only if they were necessary—perhaps even essential—to the prosecution or defense of a case, such
as depositions used at trial; and some expenses are not taxable costs. Here, the Court agrees with
Ms. Brown and finds that electronic research or photocopying charges are not taxable costs.
1

00Q10S

_

Accordingly, I shall award $155.00 for the filing fee and $155.00 service fees, for a total of $310.00
in costs.
2. Attorney's Fees
The entitlement to fees is based in the parties contract, Article XI Section 1 which
states that "costs of such enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees shall be borne by the
party(ies) in violation." The issue before the Court is whether the fees requested are both necessary
and reasonable. The standards for determination of this question are contained in Rule 1.4, Rules
of Professional Conduct, and case law, primarily Dixie State Bank v Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah
1988).
Addressing those standards, the court first finds that the hourly rates charged by all three
counsel, Mr. Lee, Ms. Schulte, and Mr. Andreason, are eminently reasonable for attorneys's of
their respective experience levels and skill in this legal community. The court specifically notes
that Mr. Lee is highly skilled, and the bill reflects appropriate involvement by him in both his
own work, and in his supervision of his associates.

In fact, the court sees no basis to reduce

any of Mr. Lee's time, except perhaps by implication in the general reduction of time post-filing
of the supplemental affidavit.
Next, the court notes that the result was entirely favorable to plaintiff, and each element
of work done for the plaintiff to achieve this result was necessary. The area that invites some
reduction in the fees is the reasonableness of the amount of time spent on each task. The court
should not nitpick a billing statement to second-guess every entry (which would also imply
second-guessing of strategic choices to some degree), but some broad categories identified by

2
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defendant should be adjusted in the court's discretion. By applying the following reductions the
court is not suggesting that the time was not invested, but sometimes a choice by counsel to
invest in excellence does not automatically translate into a reasonable charge to be imposed on
the unsuccessful litigant under fee-shifting provisions. With that brief explanation, the court will
require the following reductions:
Drafting Complaint:

deduct 2.0 hours @ $160.00 (EAS) = $320.00

Initial discovery:

deduct 4.0 hours @ $ 145.00 (RDA) = $580.00

Drafting MSJ:

deduct 5.8 hours @ 145.00 (RDA) = $841.00

Drafting Reply:

deduct 3.5 hours @ 145.00 (RDA) = $507.50

Total deduction from first Affidavit and billing detail = $2,248.50.
Finally the court limits post-initial affidavit fees to $750.00, lest this matter becomes an
ongoing dispute over fees incurred in the collection of fees. Of course, this limitation shall not
affect any future fees incurred in connection with enforcement of the order generally or collection
procedures. Plaintiffs counsel are instructed to apply the costs and fees adjustments set forth
herein.
3. Order
As a final matter, the court has received competing Orders. Defendant's objections are
not well taken. To the extent defendant re-argues her opposition to plaintiffs Motion, the
objections are overruled. Defendant contends that the Order should include Findings of Fact, but
that is contrary to the purpose or scope of summary judgment. Findings imply that the court
considered and weighed evidence to determine what is true. That did not occur. The court found

3

000110

that certain facts are undisputed, and based on that determination, the court then found that
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs proposed Order and Judgment best
states the court's process and its conclusion. Finally, defendant objects to a conclusion that she
"threatens" to continue renting her residence in contravention of the CC&Rs. Based on
defendant's statement in her objection that she has no such intention, the court has deleted that
phrase, but plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its complaint.
With the one change stated, the Order proposed by plaintiff was signed on August 25, 2008.
Dated this 29th day of August, 2008.

4

• nnnn 1

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070500211 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

2^

day of

3tfkmbty

NAME
LISA M BROWN
Defendant
3 73 INMAN COURT
DANVILLE, CA 9452 6
ERIC P LEE
Attorney PLA
ONE UTAH CENTER 13TH FLOOR
201 S MAIN ST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
/ 20 ^

.

Deputy Court Clerk
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Exhibit E

DECLARATION OF
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

003S5096

BK007U PCU0737-00

ALAN SPRIGGSr SUilrilT COUNTY RECORDER
1993 AUG 13 1 5 : 4 7 PJ1 FEE $ 4 0 . 0 0 BY
REQUEST: HIGH COUNTRY TITLE

South Ridge
Western Summit County, Utah

WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:

South Shore Group L.C.
4115 Sunrise Drive
Park City, UT 84060

DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
tor SOUTH RIDGE SUBDIVISION
SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH

THIS DECLARATION made thisZgth day of July, 1993 by South Shore Group L C , a Utah
Limrted Liability Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Declarant":

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Declarant is, at the time of recordation of this document, the owner of the real
property in the County of Summit, State of Utah, described as:

All of Lots 1 through 102, Inclusive, SOUTH RIDGE SUBDIVISION, according to the official
plat thereof, on file and of record In the office of the Summit County Recorder.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM ALL OF SUNRISE HILLS LOTS 44. 45, 46, 47. 46, 49, 50, S\t 52, 53.
58, 59, 60, 61, 78, AND 112 AS RECORDED WTH THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE,
JSLSO EKCCPT/NO. TWOSC Fblt7-iON5 * * LOTS 64
£ U N * l * « £ P f t l l / E A * .SHOUW OAl £^UTki
fZlt>*£

AMD STS Of
SU&Oltfl&IOH

SU*mS£
PLAT.

HlU>*

NOJ

56, 57,
£M&BAC£&

WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed It desirable to impose a general plan for the Improvement
and development of the portion of said tract and all of the property described herein and the adoption and
establishment of covenants, conditions and restrictions upon said real property and each and every lot
and portion thereof and upon the use, occupancy, and enjoyment thereof, all for the purpose of
enhancing and protecting the value, desirability and attractiveness of said tract, and
WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed It desirable for the efficient preservation of the value,
desirability and attractiveness of the portion of said tract and any additional property which may be
annexed thereto, pursuant to the provisions of this Declaration, to create a corporation to which should be
0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6

B*007U PG00738

Sfj

delegated and assigned the powers of maintaining and administering the common area and administering,
and enforcing these covenants, conditions, and restrictions and collecting and disbursing funds pursuant
to ihe assessments and charges hereinafter created and referred to; and
WHEREAS, South Ridge Homeowners* Association, a nonprofit corporation, Is Incorporated
under the laws of the State of Utah for the purpose of exercising the powers and functions aforesaid;
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby covenants, agrees and declares that all of said lots
and property described above and such additions thereto as may hereafter be made pursuant to
Article II hereof shall be held, sold, and conveyed subject to the following covenants, conditions,
restrictions and easements which are hereby declared to be for the benefit of the whole tract and all of
the property described herein and the owners thereof, their successors and assigns. These
covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements shall run with the said real property and shall be
binding on all parties having or acquiring any right, title or interest in the described real property or any
part thereof and shall inure to the benefit of each owner thereof and are imposed upon said real
property and every part thereof as a servitude in favor of each and every parcel thereof as the dominant
tenement or tenements.

ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
The following terms used In these covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be applicable
to this Declaration and also to any supplemental declaration recorded pursuant to Article II hereof and
are defined as follows:
Section 1. "Association" shall mean and refer to South Ridge Homeowners' Association, a
nonprofit corporation, incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah, its successors and assigns.
Section 2. "Common area" and •common facilities" shall mean all real property owned by the
Association for the common use and enjoyment of the members of the association.
Section 3. "Lot" shall mean any parcel of property shown as a separate numbered lot on the
recorded Plat of the Subdivision. Each single family dwelling unit shall be deemed to be one lot for the
purposes of this Declaration.
Section 4, "Member" shall mean and refer to every person or entity who holds membership in
the Association.
Section 5t "Owner* shall mean and refer to the record owner, whether one or more persons or
entities, of a fee simple title to any lot which is a part of the properties, including contract sellers and
buyers, but excluding those having such interest merely as security for the performances of an obligation.
Section 6. "Declarant" shall mean and refer to South Shore Group L.C., its successors and
assigns.
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Section 7T "Deed of Trust" shall mean the conveyance of any lot or other portion of the property

i

to secure the performance of an obligation.
Section 8. "Conveyance" shall mean and refer to conveyance of a fee simple title to any lot.,
Section 9. "Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain real property herein before described and
such additions thereto as hereafter may be made subject to this Declaration, and excluding any real property
that hereafter may be withdrawn from this Subdivision pursuant to this Declaration.
Section 10. "Subdivision" or "South Ridge" shall mean "South Ridge Subdivision" according to the
official plats thereof recorded In the office of Summit County, State of Utah, and any subdivision hereafter
added pursuant to the terms of this Declaration.
Section 11. "Board of Trustees" shall mean the three (3) to six (6) Members who are
elected by the Association to manage the Association. The initial Board of Trustees shall be:
James A. Doilney, 1351 Moray Court, Park City, UT 84060
Michael S. Barnes, PO Box 1980, Park City, UT 84060
Michael J. Todd, PO Box 3384, Park City, UT 84060
These individuals will serve as the board, until they are replaced by the Declarant or until the first
meeting of the Association, whichever occurs first
Section 12. "Fire Lane" shall mean the platted easement bordering lots 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 3 , 9 8 , 9 9 , and 100.
In the event an easement is established through lots 49 and/or 50 connec ting South Ridge Court to Sunrise
Drive, such easement shall become an addition to and part of the "Fire Lane."
ARTICLE II

ANNEXATION QF ADDITIONAL PROPERTY
Any real property may be annexed to and become subject to this Declaration by any of the
methods set forth hereinafter in this Article as follows:
Section 1 Annexation Without Approval and Pursuant to Gensral Plan. Any real property may

be annexed to and become subject to this Declaration and subject to the jurisdiction and a part of the
Association without the approval, assent or vote of the Association or its members, providing and on
condition that:
(a) Prior to the conveyance of title to any Improvedtotswithin the real property to be annexed to
individual purchasers thereof, fee simple title or right-of-way to the common area within said real property
shall be conveyed to the Association, free and clear of any and all encumbrances and liens, except current
real property taxes, which taxes shall be prorated to the date of transfer, and easements, covenants,
conditions and restrictions then of record, including those set forth in this Declaration.
(b) A supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and restrictions, as described
hereinafter in Section 3 of this Article describing the real property to be annexed shall be executed and
recorded by South Shore Group L C , the owner of said real property or its successors and assigns. The
recordation of said Supplementary Declaration shall constitute and effectuate the annexation of the said
0 0 3 S 5 0 9 6
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real property described therein, making said real property subject to this Declaration and subject to the
functions, powers and jurisdiction of the Association, and thereafter all of the owners of lots in said real
property shall immediately and automatically be members of the Association.
Section 2 Annexation Pursuant to Approval. Upon approval in wrrting of the Association,
pursuant to a two-thirds vote of those present at a meeting for this purpose that has been duly called of
members including proxies who are entitled to vote, any owner of communal property, multiple family units
and/or single family residential property and/or property for the common use of owners of such residential
property who desire to add such property to the plan of this Declaration and to subject such property to
the jurisdiction of the Association, may file of record a Supplementary Declaration, as described in Section
3 of this Article.
Section 3. Supplementary Declarations. The additions authorized under the foregoing sections
shall be made by filing of record a Supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
or similar instrument, with respect to the additional property which shall extend to the plan of this
Declaration to such property.
Such Supplementary Declarations contemplated above may contain such complementary
additions and modifications of the covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in this Declaration as
may be necessary to reflect the different character, if any, of the added property and as are not
inconsistent with the plan of this Declaration. In no event, however shall any such Supplementary
Declaration merger or consolidation, revoke, modify or add to the covenants established by this
Declaration within the existing property, except as hereinafter otherwise provided.
The recordation of said Supplementary Declaration shall constitute and effectuate the
annexation of the said real property described therein, making said real property subject to this Declaration
and subject to the functions, powers and jurisdiction of the Association, and thereafter all of the owners of
lots in said real Property shall automatically be members of the association.
Section 4. Mergers or Consolidations. Upon a merger or consolidation of the Association with
another association, as provided In Its Articles of Incorporation, its properties, rights and obligations may,
by operation of law, be transferred to another surviving or consolidated association or, alternatively, the
properties, rights and obligations of another association may, by operation of law, be added to the
properties, rights and obligations of the Association as a surviving corporation pursuant to a merger. The
surviving or consolidated association may administer the covenants, conditions and restrictions
established by this Declaration within the existing property, together with the covenants and restrictions
established upon any other property, as one plan.
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ARTICLE III
MEMBERSHIP
Section 1. Membership. Every person or entity who is a record owner of a fee or undivided fee

5

Interest in any lot which Is subject by covenants of record to assessment by the Association, shall be a
member of the Association. The terms and provisions set forth In this Declaration, which are binding upon
all owners of ail lots and all members In the Association, are not exclusive, as the member shall, in addition,
be subject to the terms and provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the Association.
The foregoing Is not Intended to include persons or entities who hold an interest merely as security for the
performance of an obligation. No owner shall have more than one membership for each lot owned.
Membership shall be appurtenant to and may not be separate from the ownership of any lot which is
subject to assessment by the Association. Ownership of such lot shall be the sole qualification for
membership.
Section 2. Transfer. The membership held by any owner of a lot shall not be transferred,
pledged or alienated in any way, except upon the sale or encumbrance of such lot, and then only to the
purchaser or deed of trust holder of such lot. Any attempt to make a prohibited transfer is void, and will not
be reflected upon the books and records of the Association. In the event the owner of any lot should fail
or refuse to transfer the membership registered in his name to the purchaser of such lot, the Association
shall have the right to record the transfer upon the books of the Association.
Section 3. Voting Rights, The Association shall have two (2) classes of voting membership.
Class A, Class A members shall be all those owners as defined in Section 1 above with the
exception of the Declarant. Class A members shall be entitled to one (I) vote for each lot in which they hold
the interest required for membership by Section 1. When more than one person holds such interest In
any lot, all such persons shall be members. The vote for such lot shall be exercised as they among
themselves determine, but in no event shall more than one (I) vote be cast for any one lot.
Glas&JBLThe Class B member shall be the Declarant. The Class B member shall be entitled to
three (3) votes for each lot In which H holds the interest required for membership by Section 1.
All voting rights shall be subject to the restrictions and limitations provided herein and in the
Articles and Bylaws of the Association.

ARTICLE IV
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THF COMMON AREAS
Section 1. Members' Easemflpts of Eniovmsnt Every member shall have a right and easement
of enjoyment in and to the common area, Fire Lane, and such easement shall be appurtenant to and shall
pass with the title to every assessed lot, subject to the following provisions:
(a) The right of the association to establish uniform rules and regulations pertaining to the use of
the common area including but not limited to private streets and the recreational facilities thereof.
(b) The right of the Association, in accordance with its Articles and Bylaws, to borrow money for
the purpose of improving the common area and facilities and to aid thereof, to mortgage said property,
provided that the rights of any mortgagee shall be subordinate to the rights of the members.
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(c) The right of the Association to dedicate or transfer all or any part of the common area to any
public agency, authority or utility, or to any association or master association or multiple homeowners
associations for such purposes and subject to such conditions as may be agreed to by the members. No
such dedication or transfer shall be effective unless a written Instalment pursuant to a two-thirds majority
vote oi those present at a meeting for this purpose that has been duly called of members including
proxies who are entitled to vote has been recorded, agreeing to such dedication or transfer, and unless
written notice of the proposed action is sent to every member not less than ten (10) days in advance.
However, the Declarant reserves the right to grant easements over any part of the common area or any
other designated utility easement areas for utility purposes.
(d) The right of the Declarant (and Its sales agents and representatives) to the non-exclusive
use of the common area and the facilities thereof, for display and exhibit purposes in connection with the
sale of any real property, which right Declarant hereby reserves. No such use by Declarant or its sales
agents or representatives shall otherwise restrict the members in their use and enjoyment of the common
areas or facilities thereof.
Section 2. Delegation of Use. Any member may delegate, in accordance with the Bylaws, his
right of enjoyment to the common area and facilities to the members of his family, his tenants or contract
purchasers who reside on the property.
Section 3. Waiver of Use. No member may exempt himself from personal liability for
assessments duly levied by the Association, nor release thetotowned by him from the liens and charges
hereof, by waiver of the use and enjoyment of the common area and the facilities thereon or by
abandonment of his lot other than by sate thereof.
Section 4. Title to the Common Area. The Declarant hereby covenants for itself, Its successors
and assigns, that in the event ft designates any portion of the properties as a common area, that it will
convey fee simple title or rights-of-way to such common areas in the existing property to the Association,
free and clear of all encumbrances and Hens, except current real property taxes, which taxes shall be
prorated to the date of transfer, and easements, conditions and resen/ations then on record, including
those set forth In this Declaration.
Section 5. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed to obligate Declarant to
designate or provide any part of the properties as common area.
ARTICLE V
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 1 Creation of the lien and Personal Obligation of Assessments. Each member, by
acceptance of a real estate contract or deed therefor, covenants and agrees to pay to the Association: (I)
regular assessments or charges, and (2) special assessments for capital Improvements, and other
Association purposes, such assessments to be fixed, established and collected from time to time as
0 0 3 S 5 0 9 6
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hereinafter provided, and shall be a continuing lien upon the Lot against which each such assessment is
made. Each such assessment together with any interest, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also
be the personal obligation of the owner of such property at the time when the assessment fell due. In any
conveyance, except to a mortgagee holding a first lien on the subject Lot, the grantee of a Lot shall be
Jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the latter up to the time of the
e

grant or conveyance, without prejudice to the grantee's nght to recover from the grantor the amounts paid
by the grantee. However, any such grantee shall be entitled to a statement from the Board of Trustees
setting forth the amounts of the unpaid assessments against the grantor, and such grantee shall not be
liable for, nor shall the Lot conveyed by subject to a lien for, any unpaid assessments against the grantor in
the excess of the amount set forth. No membership may be transferred to a subsequent purchaser until all
assessments, interest, penalties and other charges that are due have been paid in full to the Association.
Section 2. Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied by the Association shall be used
exclusively for the purpose of promoting the recreation, health, safety and welfare of the members of the
Association and, in particular, for the improvement and maintenance of the properties, Fire Lane, services,
and facilities devoted to this purpose and related to the use and enjoyment of the common area.
Following initial improvement of the Fire Lane by the Declarant, the improvement and maintenance of the
Fire Lane, including snow removal, shall be the obligation of the Association.
Section 3. Regular Assessments. The amount and time of payment of regular assessments
shall be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association after giving due consideration to the
current maintenance costs and future needs of the Association. Written notice of the amount of an
assessment, regular or special, shall be sent to every owner, and the due date for the payment of same
shall be set forth in said notice.
Section 4. Special Assessments. In addition to the regular assessments authorized above, the
Association may levy special assessments for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any
construction or reconstruction, repair or replacement of a capital improvement upon the common area,
including fixtures and personal property related thereto, or costs incurred for any other Association
purpose, provided that any such assessment shall have the assent of a majority of the Members entitled to
vote at a meeting duly called for this purpose. Written notice of such meeting shall be sent to all Members
not less than ten (10) calendar days nor more than thirty (30) calendar days in advance of the meeting.
Section 5. Uniform Rate of Assessment. Both regular and special assessments shall be fixed at
an identical rate for all lots owned by members and may be collected monthly or at such other times as the
Board may determine. If an assessment for improvements of costs is more or less beneficial to one or more
types of lots (single family residential, multiple dwelling condominium, commercial) such assessments may
be levied at a rate reflecting such difference in benefits.
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Section 6. Data of Commencement of Regular Assessments and Fixing Thereof, The regular
assessments provided for herein shall commence as to all lots on the first day of the month following the

8

purchase of each lot to an individual owner. Monthly, quarterly or annual assessments will be payable as
designated by the Board of Trustees of the Association.
Section 7. Certificate of Payment. The Association shall, upon the written request of any Lot
owner or any encumbrancer or prospective encumbrancer of a Lot, and upon payment of a reasonable fee
not to exceed $10, fssue to the requesting person or persons, a written statement setting forth the
unpaid assessments with respect to the Lot covered by the request. This written statement of
Indebtedness is conclusive upon the remaining Lot owners in favor of all persons who rely thereon in

1

good faith. Unless the Association complies with the request for a statement of indebtedness within ten
(10) days, all unpaid assessments, which became due prior to the date of the making of such request are
subordinate to the lien held by the person requesting the statement. Any encumbrancer holding a lien
payable with respect to the Lot and upon payment the encumbrancer shall have a lien on such Lot for the
amounts paid of the same rank as the lien of his Lot.
Section 8. Exempt Property. The following property subject to this Declaration shall be exempt
from the assessments created herein:
(a) All properties dedicated to and accepted by a local government or public authority; and
(b) The common area, if any.

ARTICLE VI

NONPAYMENT OF ASSESSMENTS
Section t. Delinquency. Any assessment provided for in this Declaration, which is not paid
when due, shall be delinquent. With respect to each assessment not paid within fifteen (15) days after its
due date, the Association may, at its election, require the Owner to pay a "late charge" in the sum to be
determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100 per year. If any such assessment is not paid
within thirty (30jhdays after the delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the date of
delinquency at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum, and the Association may, at its option,
bring an action at law against any person obligated to pay the same, or, upon compliance with the notice
provisjor)^ set forth in .^ntinn 2 {lergof, to foreclose the lien (provided for the Section 1 of Article V
hereof) against the Lot, and there shall be added to the amount of such assessment aHY l a * e charges,
interest and all costs of collecting the same, including a reasonable qyome/5 fpe. whether incurred by
filing suit or not. Each Owner vests in the Association or its assigns, the right and power to bring all actions
at law or in equity or lien foreclosure against all proper parties for the collection of such delinquent
assessments.
{Section 2. Notice of Llep. No action shall be brought to foreclose said assessment lien or to
proceed under the power of sale, provided herein, prior to thirty (30) days after the date a notice of claim of
lien Is deposited In the United States mail, certified or registered, to the owner of said lot.
Section 3. Foreclosure Sale. Any such foreclosure and subsequent sale provided for above is
0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6

9

BK007H

PG00745

to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah relating to liens, mortgages, and deeds
of trust. The Association, through Its duly authonzed agents, shall have the power to bid on the lot at
foreclosure sate, and to acquire and hold, lease, mortgage, and convey the same.
Section 4. Curing of Default. Upon the timely curing of any default for which a notice of claim of
lien was filed by the Association, the officers of the Association are hereby authonzed to file or record, as
the case may be, an appropnate release of such notice, upon payment by the defaulting owner of a fee, to
be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $50 to cover the costs of prepanng and filing or
recording such release, together with payment of such other costs, interest or fees as shall have been
incurred.
Section 5. Cumulative Remedies. The assessment lien and the rights to foreclosure and sale
thereunder shall be in addition to and not in substitution for all other rights and remedies which the
Association and its assigns may have hereunder and by law, including a suit to recover a money judgment
for unpaid assessments, as above provided.
Section 6. Subordination of Assessment Liens. If any lot subject to a monetary lien created by
any provision hereof shall be subject to the lien of a deed of trust: (I) the foreclosure of any lien created by
anything set forth in this Declaration shall not operate to affect or impair the lien of such deed of trust; and
(2) the foreclosure of the lien of deed of trust or the acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure of the
deed of trust shall not operate to affect or impair the lien hereof, except that the lien hereof for said
charges as shall have accrued to the foreclosure or the acceptance of the deed in itpu of foreclosure shall
be subordinate to the lien of the deed of trust, with the foreclosure-purchaser or deed-in-lieu grantee
taking title free of the lien hereof for all said charges that have accrued up to the time of the foreclosure of
deed given in lieu of foreclosure, but subject to the lien hereof for all said charges that shall accrue
subsequent to the foreclosure or deed given in lieu of foreclosure.

ARTICLE VII
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL
It is the intent of the Declarant to build all the homes within the subdivision. Homes built by the
Declarant, whether part of the Association as defined herein or part of a larger Association expanded to
incorporate additional lots, shall be required to comply with the architectural intent of this section, but not
required to complete the filings specified herein. All other parties shall be required to complete the filings
specified herein.
Section 1. Approval bv Architectural Cflrrimrttee. No building, fence, wall, or any other structure
shall by commenced, erected, or maintained upon the properties, nor shall any extenor addition to or
change or alteration therein be made, nor shall any excavating, alteration of any stream, waterway, pond,
or cleanng, removal of shrubs or trees or landscaping on any lot within the properties be done unless a
written application is submitted for approval of such improvement or improvements to the Architectural
0 0 3 S 5 0 9 6
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Committee and in connection therewith shall submit two complete sets of plans and specifications for the
proposed improvement or Improvements, together with a reasonable processing fee as determined by
the Architectural Committee. For buildings, such submittal shall Include:
(a) An overall view of the proposed Improvement or improvements.
(b) The location of said Improvement or improvements on the lot upon which it or they will be
placed or constructed and the location of the proposed improvement or improvements relative to other
improvements on said lot.
(c) Floor plans of each floor level.
(d) The basic structural system of the improvement or improvements and the materials to be
used in the construction thereof.
(e) Elevations.
(f) Provision for temporary and permanent paricmg of vehicles in connection with use of the
facility.
(g) Design and layout of proposed sewage lines to sewer system,
(h) Proposed time schedule for construction to completion.
(i) A survey acceptable to the Architectural Committee locating lot corners and the proposed
building position.
(|) Any additional demands or requirements for culinary or irrigation water.
(k) Specifications for water conserving plumbing fixtures in compliance with Article X Section 14
herein.
Section 2. The Architectural Committee shall not give rts consent to the proposed improvement
unless, in the opinion of the Architectural Committee, the improvement is property designed and the
design, contour, materials, shapes, colors, and general character of the improvement shall be in harmony
with existing structures on the lot and on neighboring lots, and in harmony with the surrounding
landscape, and the improvements shall be designed and located upon the lot so as to minimize the
disruption to the natural land forms.
Section 3. The Architectural Committee shall have the right to disapprove any application in the
event said application and the plans and specifications submitted therewith are not of sufficient detail, or
are not in accordance with the provisions herein set forth, or if the design or constaiction of the proposed
improvement is not in harmony with neighboring improvements and the general surroundings, or if the
design and the plans for construction do not include sufficient safeguards for preservation of the
environment. The decision of the Architectural committee shall be final, binding and conclusive on all of
the parties affected. At no time will the Arcnrtectural Committee unreasonably restrict or refuse any
proposed improvement.
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Section 4. Declarant reserves therightto change, at any time, the bounds and area of any lot
owned by rt provided such change does not adversely affect the access to any lot sold to a third party, and

that such change has been approved and Is in accordance with the various county, state, and/or federal
regulations controlling this Subdivision.
Section 5. Non-Waiver. The approval of the Architectural Committee of any plans, drawings, or
specifications for any work done or proposed, or in connection with any other matter, requiring the
approval of the Architectural Committee under these restrictions, shall got be deemed to constitute a
waiver of anyrightto withhold approval as to any similar plan, drawing, specification or matter whenever
subsequently or additionally submitted for approval. Upon approval or disapproval of the plans by the
Architectural Committee, one set of plans shall be returned to the lot owner and one set shall be retained
by the Committee. If the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove such design and location
within thirty (30) days after said plans and specifications have been submitted to It, approval will not be
required and this Article will be deemed to have been fully complied with. In order to obtain such approval,
the owner must submit for consideration of the Architectural Committee such details and information with
relation to the contemplated action as the Architectural Committee shall request.
Section 6. Professional Assistance. If at any time the Architectural Committee shall determine
that it would be in the best Interest of the members and owners of the Subdivision for such owner to
employ professional assistance, to design any improvement involved in the proposed work, the
Architectural Committee shall inform such owner in writing of Its determination, whereupon all plans and
specifications shall be prepared by such qualified professionals as the Architectural Committee shall
determine at the expense of such owner.
Section 7. Landscaping Control. Each member shall maintain his lot in an attractive and safe
manner so as not to detract from the community.
Section 8. Architectural Committee Rules. The Architectural Committee may, from time to time
and in its sole discretion adopt, amend, and repeal by unanimous vote, rules and regulations to be known
as "Architectural Committee Rules- which, among other things interpret or Implement the provisions of
Section 1 to be applied to all improvements occurring or commencing after such adoption, amendment, or
repeal. A copy of the Architectural Committee Rules as they may from time to time be adopted, amended
or repealed, certified by any member of the Architectural Committee, shall be available from the
Architectural Committee.
Section 9. Building and Landscaping Time Restrictions. The exterior construction of all
structures shall be completed within one (1) year following commencement of construction. The front
yard of each lot shall be landscaped within a period of one (1) year following completion or occupancy of
each dwelling. Side and rear yards shall be landscaped within a period of two (2) years following
completion or occupancy of each dwelling.
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All members of the Association possessing vacant lots shall be responsible for keeping such
lots clean in appearance and free from all refuse and potential fire hazards. No vacant lot shall be used for
storage of any kind except during the construction period.

1 O

Section 10. Appointment of Architectural Committee. The Declarant shall appoint the
Architectural Committee, consisting of not less than three (3) members for a term not to exceed three (3)
years. In the event of the death or resignation of any member of the Committee, the Board of Trustees of
the Association, with the approval of the Declarant, shall appoint such members successor.
Section 11. Liability. Neither the Architectural Committee nor any member thereof shall be liable
to any owner or third persons for any damage, loss or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (a) the
approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings and specifications, whether or not defective; (b) the
construction or performance of any wortc, whether or not pursuant to approved plans, drawings and
specifications; or (c) the development or manner of development of any property within the subdivision.
Section 12. General Provisions. The powers and duties of such Committee shall be in force for a
period of forty (40) years from the date of recording of this Declaration. Such powers and duties shall
continue following the forty year period unfil a written instrument has been executed and duly recorded by
the then record owners of a majority of the lots appointing a representative or representatives who shall
thereafter exercise the same powers previously exercised by said Committee. Said representatives may
be the members of the Board of Trustees of the Association.
Section 13. Variances, A petition may be filed for a variance by any owner. The Architectural
Committee may, in its sole discretion, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the
Architectural Committee, allow reasonable variances as to any of the covenants and restrictions contained
in this instrument, on such terms and conditions as it shall require.

ARTICLE Ylll
DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE ASSOCIATION
Section 1, Duties and Powers, in addition to the duties and powers enumerated in the Articles
of Incorporation and By-laws, or elsewhere provided for herein, and without limiting the generality thereof,
the Association shall:
(a) Own and/or maintain and otherwise manage all of the Fire Lane, common areas and all
facilities, improvements and landscaping thereon, including but not limited to the private streets and street
fixtures, any under drain system, and all other property acquired by the Association.
(b) Pay any real and person property taxes and other changes assessed against the common
areas.
(c) Have the authority to obtain, for the benefit of all of the common areas, all water, gas, sanitary
sewer, electncal, and refuse collection services.
(d) Grant easements where necessary to utilities and sewer facilities over the common areas to
serve the common areas and the lots.
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(e) Maintain such policy or policies of insurance as the Board of Trustees of the Association
deems necessary or desiraoie in furthering the purposes of and protecting the interest of the Association

and its members.
(f) Have the authority to employ a manager or other persons and to contract with Independent
contractors or managing agents to perform all or any part of the duties and responsibilities of the
Association.
(g) Have the power to establish and maintain a working capital and contingency fund in an
amount to be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association.
(h) Have the power to: establish uniform maintenance standards for all Lots; lien any Lot.
whether improved with a building or buildings or not, which is not being properly maintained as
determined by the Board of Trustees; and enter any Lot to perform required maintenance on ths Lot of
the exterior surface of buildings.

ARTICLE IX
EASEMENTS
Section 1. The rights and duties of the owners of lots within the properties with respect to
sanitary sewer and water, electricity, solar heating systems, gas, telephone, cable television lines and
drainage facilities shall be governed by the following:
(a) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water connections or electricity, gas or
telephone and cable television lines, solar heating systems, or drainage facilities are installed within the
properties, which connections, lines or facilities, or any portion hereof lie in or upon lots owned by the
Association or other than the owner of a lot served by said connections, the Association and the owners
of any lot served by said connections, lines or facilities shall have the right, and are hereby granted an
easement to the full extent necessary thereof, to enter upon the lots or to have utility companies or
service companies enter upon the lots within the properties in or upon which said connections, lines or
facilities, or any portion thereof, lie, to repair, replace and generally maintain said connections as and when
the same may be necessary as set forth below.
(b) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water connections or electricity, gas or
telephone or cable television lines, solar heating systems, or drainage facilities are installed within the
properties, which connections serve more than one lot, the owner of each lot served by said connections
shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of such portions of said connections as service his lot.
Section 2. Easements over the lots and common area properties for the installation and
maintenance of electric, telephone, cable television, water, gas, and sanitary sewer lines, drainage
facilities, solar heating systems, and street entrance ways as shown on the recorded tract map of the
properties, or other documents of record, are hereby reserved by Declarant, together with the right to
grant and transfer the same for the use and benefit of the members of the Association.
Section 3. Easements for installation and maintenance of utilities and drainage facilities are
reserved as shown on the recorded Plat and typically within ten feet of any lot boundary. Notwithstanding
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the preceding sentence, owners are advised that easement dimensions change on specific lots as noted
on the recorded Plat. Within these easements, no structure, including bridges, planting or other materials
shall be placed or permitted to remain which may damage or interlere with the installation and maintenance
of utilities, or which may change the direction of flow of water through drainage channels in the
easements. The easement area of each lot and ail improvements in it shall be maintained continuously by
the owner of the lot, except for those improvements for which a public authority or utility company is
responsible.
Section 4. No fences may be built closer than ten feet to the rear or side lot line without
approval by the Architectural Committee. Any fences built at more than ten feet, but less than eighteen
feet from the rear lot line, may be subject to temporary removal at lot owner's expense in order to allow
access for maintenance of the drainage facilities.

ARTICLE X
USE RESTRICTIONS
The general objectives and Intent of these covenants, restrictions and conditions is to create and
maintain a large residential district characterized by the following; single family homes, private parks, open
spaces and/or playgrounds; well kept lawns, trees and other plantings; minimum vehicular traffic; and quiet
residential conditions favorable to family living.
Section 1. Zoning Regulations. The lands within the properties shall newer be occupied or used
by or for any building or purpose or in any manner which is contrary to the planning and zoning ordinances
and regulations applicable thereto validly enforced from time to time.

Section 2, Land Use and Building Type,
(a) No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes. No buildings shall be
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single family dwelling
not to exceed two stories in height exclusive of basement. No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will
be allowed on any single family residential lot. The structures existing on lots 101 and 102 at the time of
this declaration are exempted from this section.
(b) No single story dwelling shall be erected or placed on any tot in the subdivision with floor
space in said dwelling of less than 1200 square feet on the ground level; excluding garage and patio.
(c) Two-story dwellings shall have at least 1500 square feet, exclusive of garage and patio.
(d) All single family dwellings may include the following accessory building and structures not
used for residential occupancy; an attached private garage for the storage of not more than four
automobiles; greenhouses for private use only; and one small storage shed.
(e) Every single family dwelling must have a minimum of a two-car garage.
(f) Driveways for single family dwellings must be large enough to accommodate two parked
automobiles side by side.
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(g) No fences shall be allowed In the front yards or in side yards from the average front line of the
dwelling forward or, If in side yards of corner lots which face the street, closer than 5 feet to the property
line. Hedges and landscaping will be permitted if it does not Interfere with driving visibility.
Section 3. Lot Area No single family dwelling or associated building shall be erected or placed
on any lot containing less than 7000 square feet without written approval of the Architectural Committee.
Section 4. Building Location, The goal of building location standards is to place the home as
close to the street as logical to hold site topography changes to a minimum and minimize grading on the
site. This philosophy will allow the disturbance of natural land forms and vegetation to be minimized. In no
event shall any garage door be closer than twenty (20) feet to the top back of the curb, in order to
guarantee two, off road, uncovered parking stalls on every driveway. No single family dwelling or
associated building shall be tocated on any lot nearer than five (5) feet to the road right-of-way line, except
for garage doors, which must be located at least ten (10) feet from such right-of-way, or nearer than ten
(10) feet to the rear or side lot lines. Notwithstanding any language in this Section to the contrary, if
easements for utilities, drainage, or other purposes as shown on the recorded Plat require a greater
setback from the front, rear, or side lot line than that provided for in this Section, the requirements of the
recorded Plat shall control.
Section 5. Height Requirements No single family dwelling shall be erected to a height which is
greater than thirty five (35) feet above fire fighting grade.
Section 6. Re contouring, Except as performed by the Declarant during the initial construction of
each home and the subdivision Improvements, no lot shall be re contoured in excess of four feet excluding
grading for purposes of basement construction, without prior written approval of the Architectural Committee.
Section 7. Nuisances, No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall
anything be done thereon which may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood.
Section 8. Temporary Structures. No structure of a temporary character, trailer, mobile home,
basement, tent, shack, garage, bam or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot at any time as a
residence either temporarily, meaning two or more days, or permanently. No temporary structure, house
trailer, mobile home, camper, or non-permanent outbuilding shall ever be placed or erected on any lot
except with the approval of the Architectural Committee and only then during construction. No dwelling
house on any lot shall be occupied In any manner prior to its completion without a written approval of the
Architectural Committee. No old or secondhand structures shall be moved onto any of said lots, unless
granted by a variance. The intention hereof is that all dwellings and other buildings to be erected on said
lots, or within said subdivision, shall be new construction of good quality workmanship and materials. This
Section 8 does not apply to any structure being used by Declarant, any of its employees, sub-contractors
or otherwise for construction purposes during the construction period .
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Section 9. Overnight Parking and Storage of Vehicles. No vehicle of any kind, including but not
limited to, automobiles, trucks, buses, tractors, trailers, camping vehicles, boats, boat trailers,
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snowmobiles, mobile homes, two and three wheeled motor vehicles, or other wheeled vehicles shall be
permitted to be parked on any public street within the subdivision project between the hours of 1:00
o'clock A.M. and 10:00 A.M. of any morning or at any other time while it is snowing. The storage of any
automobiles, trucks, buses, tractors, trailers, camping vehicles, boats, boat trailers, snowmobiles, mobile
homes, two and three wheeled motor vehicles, or other wheeled vehicles shall be forbidden unless such
vehicles are kept from the view of the general public common areas and/or vehicular traffic, with such
screening approved by the Architectural Committee..
Section 10, Pets. No animals, other than house pets, shall be kept or maintained. These
animals shall be contained or otherwise controlled at all times and shall be restricted to two per household.
Individual owners will be responsible to control their lots so that dust, noise and odor do not become a
problem to the property owners. Animal privileges may be revoked by the Association if the owner does
not adhere to the above restrictions.
Section 11, Sfons. No sign of any kind shall be displayed to the public view on any lot except
legal notices and one professional sign of not more than two (2) square feet, one sign of not more than
three (3) square feet advertising the property for sale or rent, or signs used by a builder to advertise the
property during the construction and sale.
Section 12. Oil and Mining Operations. No oil drilling, oil development operations, oil refining,
quarrying or mining operations of any kind shall be permitted upon any lot, or in any lot, nor shall oil wells,
tanks, tunnels, mineral excavations or shafts be permitted upon or in any lot. No derrick or other structures
designed for use in boring for oil, oil products, or natural gas shall be erected, maintained or permitted
upon any lot.
Section 13. Garbage and Refuse Disposal. No lot shall be used or maintained as a dumping
ground for rubbish, trash, garbage or other waste. Such trash, rubbish, garbage or other waste shall not
be kept except in sanitary containers. No rubbish, trash, papers, junk or debris shall be burned upon any
lot except that trash may be burned inside homes that are properly equipped with inside incinerator units.
Garbage and trash receptacles shall be permitted when kept in a visually screened enclosure and
contained in covered containers.
Section 14. Sewage Disposal. Waste Disposal and Water Supply. No individual sewage disposal
system or water supply systems shall be permitted on anytotnor may any owner pump water from or
impound any stream, waterway or pond at any time for any purpose.
All homes and common area facilities shall be fitted and furnished with water conserving toilets,
faucets, shower heads and such other water conserving devices as approved by South Ridge Mutual
Water Company Inc.
Section 15. Sight Distance at Intersections. No fence, wall, hedge or shrub planting which
obstructs sight lines at elevations between two and six feet above the roadways shall be placed or
permitted to remain on any comer lot within the triangular area formed by the street property lines and a
0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6
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line connecting them at points twenty-five (25) feet from the intersection of the street lines, or in the case
ot a rounded property corner from the intersection of the street property lines extended. The same sightline limftations shall apply on any lot within ten (10) feet from the intersection of a street property line with
the edge of a driveway or alley pavement. No tree shall be permitted to remain within such distances of
such intersection unless the foliage line Is maintained at sufficient height to prevent obstruction of such
sight lines.
Section 16. No Business Uses. The lands within the property shall be used exclusively for
single family residential living purposes and shall never be occupied or used for any commercial or
business purpose other than traditional home business conducted within the home and except that the
Declarant or its duly authorized agent may use any tot owned by Declarant as a sales off be, sales model, or
property office or rental office, and with the further exception that any owner or his duly authorized agent
may rent or lease said owner's residential building from time to time.
Section 17. No Re-Subdivision. No lot shall be re subdivided, and only one single family
residence shall be constructed or allowed to remain per lot.
Section 18. Underground Utility Llne^ All permanent water, gas. electrical, telephone and
television cables, other electronic pipes and lines and all other utility lines within the limits of the property
must be buried underground and may not be exposed above the surface of the ground.
Section 19. Maintenance of Property, All lots and all improvements on any lot shall be kept and
maintained by the owner thereof in a dean, safe, attractive and sightly condition and good repair.
Section go. No Hazardous Activities, No activity shall be conducted on any lot and no
improvements constructed on any lot which are or might be unsafe or hazardous to any person or party.
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no firearms shall be discharged upon any lot. and no open
fires shall be lighted or permitted on any lot except in a contained barbecue unit while attended and in use
for cooking purposes or within safe and well designed interior fireplaces.
Section 21. Dwelling Construction and Fence Restrictions. In order to promote a harmonious
community development and protect the character of the neighborhood, the following guidelines are set
out:
(a) Dwelling style, design, alterations or addition will conform to standards determined by the
Architectural Committee.
(b) Exterior construction materials will be limited to stone, wood, wood siding, or stucco and shall
be in earth tones indigenous to the area and approved by the Architectural Committee. No reflective finish
other than glass shall be used on exterior surfaces other than surfaces of hardware fixtures, including but
without limitation, the exterior surfaces of any of the following: roofs, all projections above roofs, retaining
walls, doors, trim, fences, pipes, equipment, and only mailboxes approved by the Architectural Commrttee
or required by the U.S. Postal Service.
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(c) Roof design shall be limited to a minimum of a 4/12 pitch unless otherwise approved by the

18

Architectural Committee Roofs shall be constructed so that no reflective surfaces are visible by other
property owners.
(d) Location of all storage or utility buildings, garbage and refuse containers, air conditioning
equipment, clothes drying lines, and utility pipes, etc., must be placed at the rear of the dwelling and
located on the site in such a manner as not to be conspicuous from the frontage street.
(e) Any light used to illuminate garages, patios, parking areas or for any other purpose shall be
so arranged as to reflect light away from adjacent residences and away from the vision of passing
motonsts.
(?) Fences or walls shall be of wood. No fences or walls of chain link, wire mesh, bnck or concrete
block (except for architectural concrete block approved by the Architectural Committee) shall be allowed
Fences, walls or hedges shall not exceed six feet in height.
Section 22. Off-Road Vehicles. No automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, trail bikes, snowmobiles,
four-wheel drive vehicles or vehicles of any kind shall be operated on any of the Declarant's property
wherever the same may be situated or any place on the subdivision other than the public roadways.
Section 23. Pnvate Area: Uses. Restrictions. The Architectural Committee or its duly authorized
agents shall have the nght, at any time, and from time to time without any liability to the Owner for trespass
or otherwise to enter upon any private area for the purpose (I) of removing any improvement constructed,
reconstructed, refimshed, altered, or maintained upon such pnvate area in violation of these covenants,
(2) of restoring or otherwise reinstating such private areas, and (3) of otherwise enforcing without any
limitation, all of the restnctions set forth in this Declaration. No improvement, excavation or other work
which in any way alters any pnvate area from its natural or improved state existing on the date such pnvate
area was first sold shall be made or done except upon strict compliance with this Declaration.
Section 24. Removal of Natural Foliage. No trees shall be removed except as is absolutely
necessary for the ingress and egress and construction of the dwelling and other structures on the lot
without the prior written approval of the Architectural Committee.
Section 25. Restoration of Cut and Fill. Declarant shall be responsible for restoration of cut and fill
slopes between the back of the curb and each respective property. All cut or fill slopes shall be restored as
per Declarant's landscaping plan for such area at the sole expense of the Declarant.
Section 26. Rules regarding Fires. No extenor fires whatsoever, except barbecue fires contained in
receptacles provided therefor, shall be allowed.
Section 27. Antennas. No antenna of any sort, either installed or maintained, which is visible from
the front of neighbonng properties shall be allowed No satellite dishes shall be permitted except as may be
albwed by the architectural rules.
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Section 2B. Rules and Regulations. No owner shall violate the rules and regulations for the use of
the lots as adopted from time to time by the Association. No such rules and regulations shall be established
which violate the intention or provisions of this Declaration or which shall unreasonably restrict the use of any
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lot by the owner hereof.

ARTICLE XI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Enforcement. The Association, shall have the right to enforce, by any proceeding at law
or in equity, including injunctive proceedings, all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and
charges now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration. Proper notice under this Section
shall be defined to require written notice of any action authorized under this Section to be sent to the
affected Member by certified mall at the Member's Lot address not less than ten (10) calendar days prior to
taking any such action. Failure by the Association or by any Owner to enforce any covenant or restriction
herein contained shall In no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. Costs of such
enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees, shall be borne by the party(ies) in violation.
Section 2. Term. These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all
persons claiming under them for a period of forty (40) years from the date these covenants are recorded, after
which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an
instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the lots has been recorded, agreeing to change said
covenants in whole or in part.
Section 3. Severability. Invalidation of any one of these covenants by judgment or court order shall
in no way affect any of the other provisions which shall remain In full force and effect.
Section 4. Amendments. At any time while any provision, covenant, condition or restriction
contained in this Declaration or amendment thereto is in force and effect, it may be amended or repealed by
the recording of a written Instrument specifying the amendment or repeal, executed by owners representing
a majority of the combined votes of both classes of membership entitled to vote. It is Intended by this
paragraph that the Declarant having three (3) votes per lot owned, as per Article III, Section 3 above, shall
have sufficient votes, by itself, to amend this Declaration until such time as 75% or more of the lots within the
properties are owned by Class A members.
Section 5. Consent to Future Zoning. Each lot owner hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of
this Declaration and of Declarants master plan and acknowledges that Declarant may request zoning
changes from time to time to permit smaller residential lots, multiple family and commercial use of Declarant's
land. Each lot owner for himself, his successors and assigns hereby consents to and covenants not to object
to any application made by Declarant for a change in zoning permitting the use of any of Declarant's land for
smaller residential lots, multiple family uses and commercial use, including but not limited to duplexes,
fourplexes, apartments, condominiums, offices, etc. Each lot owner for himself, his successors and assigns,
covenants and agrees to execute any and all instruments in writing that may be required or needed by
Declarant to obtain such zoning change or changes.
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withdraw any common area lot or lots from the operation of this Declaration prior to the sale of said lot or lots so
that said common area lot or lots shad not thereafter be subject to any of ihe provisions of this Declaration.
Section 7. Llfnrted Liability. Neither Declarant, the Association, the Trustees of the Association,
the Architectural Committee, nor any Member, Agent, Representative, Officer, Director or employee of
any of the same shall be liable to any party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter
pertaining or contemplated by this Declaration, provided, however, that this limited liability shall not apply if
the loss, expense or liability involved resulted from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of such
person. Covenants, conditions or restrictions herein contained nor the enforcement of any lien provisions
herein shall defeat or render invalid the lien of any deed of trust made in good faith and for value, but all of
said covenants, conditions and restrictions shall be binding upon and effective against any owner whose
title is derived through foreclosure of trusteed sale, or otherwise.
Section 8. Singular Includes Plural. Whenever the context of this Declaration requires same, the
singular shall include the plural and the masculine shall include the feminine.
Section 9. Nuisance, The result of every act or omission whereby any provision, condition,
restriction, covenant, easement or reservation contained in this Declaration is violated in whole or in part is
hereby declared to be and constitutes a nuisance and every remedy allowed by law or equity against a
nuisance either public or private, shall be applicable against every such result and may be exercised by the
Association or any other lot owner in the subdivision. Such remedy shall be deemed cumulative and not
exclusive.

ARTICLE XII
ARBITRATION
Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or related to this Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon ihe award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Furthermore, it is
agreed by any and all parties to this Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions that any and all
fees of the American Arbitration Association shall be paid, in advance, on a pro-rata basis by the parties to
such arbitration, or at such time as specified by the American Arbitration Association.
In the event the Association becomes involved in any controversy, claim, or dispute, regardless
of the cause, it shall attempt to avoid litigation by offering to settle through the use of binding arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Declarant has executed this instrument the day and year first herein
above written.

SOUTH SHORE GROUP LC.

Michael S. Barnes,
Manager

Manager
* _,-.

^/^h^^^^
Michael J. Todd,
Manager
STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF SUMMIT

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said county and state, on this Z8th day of July, 1993,
personally appeared James A. Doilney, Michael S. Barnes and Michael J. Todd known to me to be the
Managers of South Shore Group LC. f the Managers that executed the within instrument on behalf of the
corporation therein named, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same.
Notary I'UDUO
Pubilo
Notary
.
ROBERT 6. RODMAN J
P. O. Box 2033
I
Pork City, Utah 84060 ,
My Commission ExpTQ* I
November 27,1003
I
State of Utah
.

teh«~ ( L ^ a s —
Notary Public

Residing at:

^

CoO^.
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Exhibit F

Westlaw
Page 1

Not Reported in Cal Rptr 3d
Not Reported in Cal Rptr 3d, 2004 WL 385347 (Cal App 4 Dist)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules .1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.))

CC & R's
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available
California Rules of Court, rule 8 1115, restricts
citation of unpublished opinions in California
courts
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California
Frank RAGEN, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v
Robert PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant
No. D040766.
(Super.Ct.No. 727563).

After a court trial in which the parties presented extrinsic evidence, the trial court concluded Peterson's
proposed residence would violate the CC & R's and
that Peterson did not prove his asserted defenses,
and thus granted Ragen injunctive and declaratory
relief Peterson appeals, contending the trial court
erred because its interpretation of the CC & R's is
unreasonable as applied to him Peterson's appellate
contentions are unsupported by applicable legal authority We therefore reject his contentions and affirm the judgment
FACTS

March 2, 2004
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Wayne L Peterson, Judge Affirmed
Sandra J Biower, Sullivan, Wertz, Mc Dade &
Wallace, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Respondent
Anthony Joseph Passante, Todd F Stevens,
Keeney, Waite & Stevens, David A Niddne, Niddne & Fish, LLP, San Diego, CA, for DefendantAppellant
HALLER, Acting P J
*1 Frank Ragen sued a neighboring property owner,
Robert Peterson, alleging Peterson's plan to build a
residence on his vacant lot violated written restrictions (CC & R's) governing the subdivision The
trial court initially granted Ragen's summary judgment motion, but on appeal this court reversed the
judgment determining Ragen did not meet his summary judgment burden to show the CC & R's unambiguously precluded Peterson from building a residence on his property In reversing, we agreed with
Peterson that on remand the parties would be permitted to present extrinsic evidence that was relevant to clarify the ambiguous terms contained in the

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West

A Governing Written Document
The parties own property in a subdivision known as
La Jolla Corona Estates (Corona Estates), governed
by a "Declaiation of Restrictions" recorded in 1956
(the Corona Estates CC & R's) The preamble to the
Corona Estates CC & R's describes the property as
"Lots 1 to 65 inclusive of La Jolla Corona Estates"
as described on the 1956 recorded subdivision map
The CC & R's then identifies various conditions
and restrictions "for the benefit of said property and
of each owner," including successor owners The
restriction at issue, contained in Paragraph 3, reads
'Wo building shall be erected on any of said lots
other than one detached single family dwelling,
with gai age and such other out-buildings as may be
suitable and necessary for the purpose which said
property is permitted to be used " (Italics added)
Other CC & R's restrictions concern required setbacks, minimum square feet requirements, temporary dwellings, building materials, and signs The
CC & R's further incorporates "[a]ll of the ordinances, regulations and resolutions of the [San Diego
city council and planning commission], pertaining
to the construction of dwelling units and the zoning
thereof, which are not in effect or which may be-

Claim to Ong US Gov Works

Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. •\ Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8. 1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.))

come effective hereafter, and hereby referred to and
by this reference incorporated and made a part
hereof as though fully set forth herein."
B. Relevant History of the Corona Estates Properties
The Corona Estates property was initially owned by
Wilzel Estates, which then subdivided the property
and recorded the CC & R's. Each of the 65 lots
were then sold to individual purchasers, subject to
the 1956 recorded CC & R's. In 1958, the owners of
Lots 3 and 4 agreed to a lot line adjustment under
which Lot 3 was enlarged and Lot 4 was reduced in
size. Three years later, the Lot 3 owners constructed a residence on the enlarged Lot 3 across what
formerly would have been the boundary line
between original Lots 3 and 4.
*2 In 1976, Ragen purchased a home in the Corona
Estates subdivision on the reduced Lot 4. The home
had ocean and canyon views, as did all the other
homes in the Corona Estates subdivision. After reviewing the CC & R's, Ragen believed that no other
home could be built on the neighboring properties
and therefore his view would be protected. At the
time, Seymour Wulf owned the home on the adjacent property (the enlarged Lot 3).
Approximately three years later, Wulf obtained approval from the City of San Diego to subdivide his
enlarged property into two lots (identified as Parcel
1 and Parcel 2). Parcel 2 contained Wulfs residence; Parcel 1 was a vacant lot of approximately
14,440 square feet, an average size lot for the area.
At the time, Ragen was not legally entitled to notice
of the lot division, and was unaware the lot had
been divided.
In 1981, Wulf sold Parcel 1 to third parties (the
Hondas), who did not build on the vacant parcel.
Wulf later sold his own home located on Parcel 2.
In 1991, the Hondas sold Parcel 1 to defendant
Peterson, an experienced building contractor, for
$260,000. In 1992, Peterson scraped and cleaned

Page 2

the lot, and had a survey performed. Although
Peterson intended to build a home on the lot, he
took no action for the next six years because of the
downturn in the real estate market and construction
business.
In 1998, Peterson began processing building plans
for a single family residence on his property. Ragen
first learned of these plans in the summer of 1998,
and filed objections with the city. In November
1998, the city planning commission approved
Peterson's building plans, but the commission did
not address Ragen's claim that Peterson's proposed
home would violate the Corona Estates CC & R's.
At about the same time, Ragen learned that
Peterson's proposed home had been approved by
the Corona Estates Architectural Committee and
immediately protested this action to the Architectural Committee. The Committee responded that the
Lot 3 lot division had been legally approved by the
City. The Committee later stated it did not believe
it had the authority to make a determination on the
issue raised by Ragen and declined to become legally involved in the matter.

C. Complaint and Summary Judgment
In January 1999, Ragen filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, seeking to prevent
Peterson from building his proposed home and
seeking a judicial determination that the Corona Estates CC & R's "prohibit the construction of a
second dwelling on one of the original 65 subdivision lots that has been split into two parcels."Peterson denied that the CC & R's prevented
him from building on his parcel, and asserted several affirmative defenses, including that Ragen's
claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, laches, and changed circumstances, and that
relief should be denied because enforcing the alleged restrictions would be unfair and inequitable.
The court granted Ragen a preliminary injunction to
maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable
harm. Ragen then successfully moved for summary
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Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.))

judgment, relying solely on the written Corona Estates CC & R's document. On appeal, this court reversed the judgment, concluding that Ragen failed
to meet his summary judgment burden to establish
the CC & R's unambiguously supported judgment
in his favor. (Ragen v. Peterson (March 19, 2001,
D035435 [nonpub. opn.].) The majority found the
document was reasonably susceptible to differing
interpretations as to whether the CC & R's prevented more than one home on an original lot after the
lot had been legally subdivided. (Ibid.) We explained that it was "at least equally reasonable" that
the Paragraph 3 restriction applies to permit only
one residence per parcel of land after that parcel
has properly come into existence under the CC &
FN1
R's and state and local laws.
We stated that on
remand both parties were entitled to present relevant and admissible extrinsic evidence, if any existed, to clarify the ambiguous terms, and that this
evidence may include (1) industry custom and usage to clarify the meaning of the disputed language;
(2) evidence regarding the intent of the original developer (or owner) as to the general scheme or plan;
and (3) the nature of the particular development as
it affects the meaning of the term "lots" as used in
the document.
FN1. The dissenting justice found the CC
& R's unambiguously precluded building
more than one home per original lot, and
therefore would have affirmed the summary judgment.
D. Trial on Remand
*3 At the ensuing trial, both parties presented extrinsic evidence on the issue of the meaning of the
disputed provision and on Peterson's defenses.
With respect to the CC & R's interpretation issue,
Ragen relied primarily on the testimony of Alan
Perry, an experienced San Diego real estate attorney, who was the corporate secretary and attorney
for the original Corona Estates developer (Wilzel
Estates) in the mid-1950's when the CC & R's were
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recorded. Although the CC & R's was drafted by a
title company, Perry was responsible for reviewing
the CC & R's to ensure the CC & R's reflected the
grantor's intent before the document was recorded
and before the lots were sold. According to Perry,
Wilzel Estates sought to ensure that the building restrictions would provide for "a relatively expensive
subdivision of homes" and that subsequent purchasers could enforce these restrictions. With respect to Paragraph 3, Perry testified that the intent
of Wilzel Estates was that only one home could be
built on each original lot and the words "said lots"
contained in Paragraph 3 specifically referred to
Lots 1 through 65 identified in the preamble. Based
on his experience drafting and reviewing numerous
CC & R's in the mid-1950's, Perry further explained
that it was the custom and practice at that time to
use similarly worded contractual provisions to restrict the number of residences that could be built in
a subdivision, and there was no other method for
accomplishing this goal at that time. Perry testified
that the "custom and belief... was that the manner
in which it was stated in Paragraph 3 in these restrictions was adequate to the task. I've probably
seen between six and a dozen worded almost
identical to Paragraph 3, and perhaps it should be
emphasized that modernly we don't do it quite that
way."He further stated that the CC & R's provision
incorporating the city ordinances and regulations
was included because at that time title insurance
companies "had been subjected to criticism because
purchasers of restricted lots somehow got the idea
that those restrictions superseded the zoning regulations of the city" and the title company wanted to
make clear that the city regulations applied notwithstanding the CC & R's.
Ragen also supported his interpretation of the
Corona Estates CC & R's with his own testimony
about the nature and history of the housing development. Ragen testified his home is on a cul-de-sac
on the south side of Mount Soledad, and the homes
in the subdivision are located in such a way that
they each have some view of the water. Each lot is
relatively large and the homes are set back for pri-
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vacy. When he purchased his home in 1976, Ragen
believed the cul-de-sac was "built out" based on his
review of the CC & R's, including Paragraph 3. In
approximately 1985, Ragen first learned of the Lot
3 subdivision, but concluded the CC & R'% did not
expressly prohibit the lot split. Peterson never
spoke with Ragen, and Ragen did not learn of the
proposed development until he received a notice
from the city in the summer of 1998. Ragen testified that if Peterson is permitted to build his proposed home, the home would increase the density
and traffic in the neighborhood, eliminate Ragen's
view of the canyon and ocean, and interfere with
the "air, wind, breeze that comes up the canyon to
[his] home."
*4 In support of his position that the Corona Estates
CC & R's do not prevent him from building a home
on his lot, Peterson presented the testimony of
Katharine Rosenberry, a professor of law at California Western School of Law, who specializes in
law pertaining to common interest developments.
Rosenberry had no personal knowledge of the
Corona Estates CC & R's, and there was no foundation to show she was familiar with industry custom
and practice at the time the CC & R's were drafted.
Over Ragen's objections, Rosenberry was permitted
to testify to her opinion that Paragraph 3 does not
restrict the number of homes in the Corona Estates
subdivision and that more than one home may be
built on an original lot if that property has been legally subdivided. Rosenberry opined that although
the Corona Estates CC & R's reflect a clear intent
"to create an upscale development ...," this "intent
was not tied into a certain number of houses."In
reaching her conclusions, Rosenberry relied on the
language of the Corona Estates CC & R's, the city's
1998 approval of Peterson's building plans, and the
fact the CC & R's did not preclude lot splits.
Peterson also called William Moser, a civil engineer, who testified that based on his analysis of the
subdivision neighborhood, Peterson's proposed
home would be consistent with the existing homes
in the neighborhood in terms of size and design,
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and would not significantly increase the density in
the neighborhood. Moser further identified two
Corona Estates lots that could possibly fit a second
home, but opined that given the size and shape of
the lots and the existing homes, "there is no other
place in this subdivision that could be subdivided
similarly to what's been done with the Peterson
lot."
Peterson additionally presented evidence that before he purchased the lot he received a copy of the
CC & R's and was told by his real estate agent and
architect that the property was a buildable lot.
Peterson also retained an attorney to review the
Corona Estates CC & R's, but he did not receive
any information from his attorney leading him to
believe he could not build a home on the lot. Although he knew that his proposed home would
block Ragen's view and that Ragen would probably
object to the home, he never asked Ragen about the
nature of any objections. Peterson testified that he
has incurred $488,000 in costs relating to the property and that his property is "virtually worthless" if
a home cannot be built on it.
E. Trial Court's Decision and Judgment
After taking the matter under submission, the trial
court concluded the language of the CC & R's,
viewed in context of the surrounding circumstances
and extrinsic evidence, had only one reasonable interpretation-that only one single family dwelling
may be built on each of the original 65 subdivision
lots, even if those lots were later subdivided. In so
concluding, the court found Perry's testimony credible and "more persuasive" than Rosenberry's testimony, emphasizing that Perry was personally involved in reviewing the CC & R's before they were
recorded and was familiar with the custom and
practice in the legal community in 1956 with respect to the meaning of the disputed CC & R's provisions. Although the court did not agree with
Rosenberry's opinions, it noted that her credentials
were impressive.
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*5 With respect to Peterson's defenses, the court
stated that "[although the evidence clearly established the significant amount of monies spent by
Peterson in his efforts to prepare the lot for construction of a single-family residence, and that he
8

acted in good faith, he has failed to meet his burden
of proof that any of the affirmative defenses has
been established. The lot split in 1979, which created the parcel owned by [Peterson], did not violate
the CC & R's. [Ragen] was not required to take any
action to enforce the CC & R's until [Peterson] attempted to build a single family dwelling on the
parcel ..., which did not occur until [Peterson] obtained approval of his building plans from the City
of San Diego on November 5, 1998. [Ragen] filed
the subject action January 25, 1999. There was no
waiver by [Ragen] of his rights to enforce the CC &
R's, and the statute of limitations to do so had not
expired. [Ragen] and his wife had no duty to inform
[Peterson] or [Peterson's] predecessors in interest,
as to the CC & R's prohibition on building a single
family dwelling on defendant's parcel. [Ragen] is
not estopped from enforcing the CC & R's."
The trial court therefore concluded Ragen was entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting Peterson from constructing a dwelling on his
property. The judgment read as follows: " 1 .
[Ragen] is granted a permanent injunction enjoining defendant, his agents, servants, employees, all
persons acting under, in concert with, or for him,
and any successors in interest from building a detached single family dwelling on: [Peterson's property], [f] 2. A judicial determination and declaration is made that the CC & Rs prohibit more than
one single family dwelling for each of the original
65 subdivision lots within La Jolla Corona Estates...."
Peterson appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Interpretation of Corona Estates CC & R's
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The issue in this case concerns the proper interpretation of the Corona Estates CC & R's, specifically
Paragraph 3, which provides: "No building shall be
erected on any of said lots other than one detached
single family dwelling, with garage and such other
out-buildings as may be suitable and necessary for
the purpose which said property is permitted to be
used."(ltalics added.) Ragen contends the phrase
"said lots" refers to the 65 lots that existed on the
original parcel map, identified in the Corona Estates CC & R's preamble, and therefore Paragraph 3
precludes building more than one residence on an
original lot, even if that lot has been subsequently
legally subdivided. Peterson contends Paragraph 3
does not refer to original lots, and merely precludes
more than one building on any one legally divided
lot.
A. Generally Applicable Law and Review Standard
The interpretation of a restrictive covenant in a CC
& R's governing a subdivision is governed by contract principles. ( Hannula v. Hacienda Homes
(1949) 34 Cal.2d 442, 444-445; see Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 361, 3M-3Sl(Nahrstedt).) The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect
to the mutual intention of the parties as these intentions are objectively set forth in the written document. (Civ.Code, § 1639; Morey v. Vannucci
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912: Ticor Title Ins.
Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn . (1986) 177
Cal.App.3d 726, 730; see City of Manhattan Beach
v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.)"The
whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to
give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable,
each
clause
helping
to
interpret
the
other."(Civ.Code. § 1641.)
*6 As applied in this case, these principles mean we
must try to effectuate the legitimate desires of the
covenanting parties, the original grantor and
grantee, as those intentions are stated in the Corona
Estates CC & R's. (See Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 357;
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Ezer v. Fuchsloch (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 849,
861-862.)However, where as here, the meaning of a
provision in a CC & R's is reasonably susceptible to
more than one interpretation, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence, not to vary any of the contract
terms, but to assist in determining the parties' original intent regarding the ambiguous provision.
(See Morey v. Vanmwci, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at
p. 912; Bramwell v. Kuhle (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d
767, 776-777.)
The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review. Generally, "[t]he interpretation of a written
instrument, even though it involves what might
properly be called questions of fact..., is essentially
a judicial function" that is reviewed de novo. ( Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d
861, 865; see City of Manhattan Beaeh v. Superior
Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238.)A substantial
evidence review standard applies only if extrinsic
evidence was properly admitted and the trial court
was required to resolve factual disputes in the underlying relevant facts. ( Estate of Dodge (1971) 6
Cal.3d 311, 318; Parsons, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p.
866, fn. 2; Capitol Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Mega
Construction Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1049,
1056.)"[I]t is only when the foundational extrinsic
evidence is in conflict that the appellate court gives
weight to anything other than its de novo interpretation of the parties' agreement."( Medical Operations Management, Inc. v. National Health Laboratories, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 886. 891.)
In this case, the relevant foundational facts surrounding the execution of the Corona Estates CC &
R's and the nature of the subdivision were not disputed. The appellate issues concern the meaning of
ambiguous contractual language, including the
question of what inferences the court should draw
from the CC & R's language and the undisputed
factual context in which the CC & R's was executed. Conflicting expert testimony as to the legal
interpretation of a contract has no effect on our
duty to independently interpret the policy language.
(See Cooper Companies v. Transcontinental Ins.
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Co. (1995) 31 Ca1.App.4th 1094, 1100.)Thus, we
conduct a de novo review of the record in determining the proper interpretation of the CC & R's.
B. Analysis
Applying these principles, we conclude the covenanting parties-i .e., Wilzel Estates and each initial
grantee-intended to restrict the number of homes in
the subdivision to one home for each original subdivided lot. Although in our prior opinion the majority of this court found the contractual language
facially ambiguous (i.e., reasonably susceptible to
either party's interpretation), this ambiguity has
been substantially resolved by the testimony of
Alan Perry, who was the corporate secretary and attorney for the grantor at the time the CC & R's were
drafted and recorded. Perry testified that in attempting to create a relatively expensive subdivision of
homes, Wilzel Estates included several building
and use restrictions in the Corona Estates CC & R's,
including Paragraph 3, which was intended to limit
the number of homes to one home per original lot
and that the phrase "said lots" in Paragraph 3 referred to Lots 1 through 65 of the subdivision as
stated in the CC & R's preamble.
*7 Although there was no direct evidence that this
was also the grantees' understanding, Perry's testimony about the relevant custom and practice supports the reasonable inference that at the time of the
conveyance the grantees would have interpreted
this provision in the same manner. Perry testified
that he was familiar with the industry custom and
practice in 1955 with respect to CC & R's restrictions and that it was a custom and practice to use
similarly worded contractual provisions to restrict a
subdivision to a certain number of residences. Although Perry acknowledged that the Corona Estates
CC & R's did not expressly limit lot divisions, he
explained that it was not the custom or practice to
specifically include this type of provision and "I
don't think we even thought about it because we
didn't think anybody would be so foolish as to"
subdivide a lot when only one house could be built
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on each original lot
Perry's testimony is consistent with the evidence of
the intended purpose and nature of the subdivision
As both Perry and Rosenberry recognized, the
Corona Estates CC & R's was drafted with the obvious purpose of creating an upscale and spacious
residential subdivision, and by recording the various building restrictions, the grantor and each of
the purchasers had a reasonable expectation that
this character of the neighborhood would be maintained throughout the years If Corona Estates property owners are now permitted to split their lots and
then build on each new lot, the character of the
neighborhood (I e , density, views, traffic) would
not be maintained Although Peterson argues that
he is the only property owner that could, in practical terms, build a second home on a divided lot, the
evidence did not support this position Peterson's
engineering expert, Moser, acknowledged that at
least two other lots could support an additional residence The fact that these lots arguably could not
be subdivided under current city planning rules
does not mean that these rules will necessarily continue in the future
In construing the CC & R's, it is further relevant
that in the past 48 years no other lot owner has attempted to split an original lot or build a second
home within original lot boundaries, except for one
property owner who abandoned an effort to build a
second home after neighborhood opposition While
this evidence is not conclusive, it supports the conclusion that the mutual understanding of the seller
and buyers was that Paragraph 3 of the CC & R's
prohibited more than one home on each original lot
"The rule is well settled that where a contract is
ambiguous, the court may consider the subsequent
conduct of the parties for the purpose of discovering their intent in entering into a contract
It is
generally recognized that the acts of the parties to a
contract afford one of the most reliable means of
arriving at their intention "( Western Medical Enterprises hit \ Alters (1985) 166 Cal App 3d 383.
391 )
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*8 Although Rosenberry's opinions were different
from Perry's testimony, there was no foundation
showing she had any personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the CC & R's were drafted
or that she had any knowledge or experience with
respect to the applicable custom and practice in
1955 As we cautioned in our prior opinion, although expert testimony may be admissible to the
extent it is relevant and helpful to resolve ambiguities in a contract, expert evidence is not admissible
"solely to offer a legal opinion as to the meaning of
the CC & R's "(Ragen v Peterson, supra,
D035435 )Rosenberry's testimony was offered as
expert opinion on the manner in which the language
of the CC & R's should be interpreted, a subject
matter that is solely a judicial function (See
Cooper Companies v Transcontinental Ins Co,
supra 31 Cal App 4th at p 1100 )

C Peterson's Contentions
On appeal, Peterson does not challenge the admissibility or relevance of Perry's testimony or Ragen's
other proffered extrinsic evidence, nor does he even
mention Rosenberry's testimony Instead, he disregards the evidence admitted at trial and devotes his
appellate briefs to arguing that an interpretation of
the Corona Estates CC & R's that permits only one
home per original lot is unreasonable and unfair as
applied to him
Ragen counters that Peterson's failure to discuss the
admitted extrinsic evidence in his appellate briefs
constitutes a waiver of his right to maintain the appeal We need not reach this waiver issue because
Peterson's challenge to the reasonableness of the
trial court's interpretation is unsupported by applicable legal principles A court's fundamental task is
not to determine whether a challenged CC & R's
provision is "reasonable" or "fair" or whether the
CC & R's should have been written in a certain
way, but it is to effectuate the actual intent of the
grantor and grantee (See hahstedt
supra 8
Cal 4th at p 381, Ezei \ Fuchsloth supra 99
Cal App 3d at p 862 )"Like any promise given in
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exchange for consideration, an agreement to refrain
from a particular use of land is subject to contract
principles, under which courts try 4to effectuate the
legitimate
desires
of
the
contracting
parties.'[Citation.]" ( Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
pp. 380 381.)" 'We may not understand why property owners want certain obligations to run with the
land, but as it is their land ... some very strong reason should be advanced' before courts should override those obligations." {Id. at p. 381, quoting Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law
of Servitudes (1982) 55 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1353, 1359.)
In Nahrstedt, the legal issue concerned the interpretation of a CC & R's provision for a condominium development, which is governed by a specific
statutory scheme (Civ.Code. § 1350 et seq.;
Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 370-384). In interpreting the enforcement provisions of these statutes, the California Supreme Court held that the Legislature intended to apply equitable servitude law
as the standard for enforcing CC & R's in condominium (common interest) developments.
(Nahrstedt, supra, at p. 380.)After extensively surveying applicable equitable servitude law, the
Nahrstedt court "distill[ed]" these principles: "An
equitable servitude will be enforced unless it violates public policy; it bears no rational relationship
to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose
of the affected land; or it otherwise imposes burdens on the affected land that are so disproportionate to the restriction's beneficial effects that the restriction should not be enforced."(Id. at p. 382, italics added.) Further, the court stated that in evaluating a property owner's arguments that the enforcement of a CC & R's provision is unreasonable, "the
focus is on the restriction's effect on the project as a
whole, not on the individual homeowner."(M at p.
386.)These principles apply here because the CC &
R's provision at issue is in the nature of an equitable servitude. (See Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp.
352-355.)
*9 The record here does not show the interpretation
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of Paragraph 3 to restrict one home to each original
lot is unreasonable under any of the Nahrstedt
factors. First, the restriction is not arbitrary. As
both experts recognized, a covenant restricting the
number of homeseper lot is a common and reasonable method for maintaining the density and character of a neighborhood. The restriction of one home
per original lot bears a rational relationship to ensuring the continuation of the upscale and uncrowded nature of the neighborhood,
Second, there is no fundamental public policy that
would be violated by interpreting Paragraph 3 to
refer to a one-home per original-lot restriction.
Peterson complains that this interpretation of the
CC & R's "ties all future property rights in the development to ancient title."But there is nothing in
the public policy of this state preventing this result.
To the contrary, that is precisely the purpose of recording a CC & R's applicable to a residential subdivision, so that buyers purchasing property subject
to the restrictions can rely on the prior restrictions
in determining whether to purchase the home. (See
Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 363-368.)Peterson's reliance on Welch v. Kai (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 374 for
his argument that property rights may not be tied to
"ancient title" is misplaced because in that case the
court merely interpreted a subdivision map "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of [the grantor]
as it existed at the time of the execution of the instrument." (Id. at p. 378.)That is precisely the principle that we apply in this case. Additionally, the
fact that Lot 3 was legally divided does not preclude a finding that the CC & R's restriction controls. ( MuJlally v. Ojai Hotel Co . (1968) 266
Cal.App.2d 9, 12 [recorded declaration controls to
extent it is more restrictive than zoning ordinance].)
Third, interpreting the CC & R's to permit no more
than one home per original lot does not impose a
burden on the use of the land that "far outweighs"
any benefit. ( Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p.
382.)Peterson argues repeatedly that we should adopt his interpretation because the burden that would
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be imposed on Ragen (losing his ocean view) is
minor when compared to the burden on Peterson in
losing his substantial investment in the land and
creating a situation where the vacant lot is now
worthless. However, in balancing the relevant
factors, it is not appropriate to focus on the restriction's burden to the individual homeowner. (Id. at p.
386.)Rather, as made clear by Nahrstedt, a court is
required to compare the benefits and burdens to the
entire subdivision. The one home for each original
lot restriction burdens the subdivision because a
property owner is prohibited from selling a portion
of his or her lot to a third party as a building site.
While this does affect the marketability of the property and restrict the freedom of each property owner, it also substantially enhances the property value
of the homes by maintaining the low density and
upscale character of the neighborhood. On this record, the restriction does not impose a burden that
far outweighs the benefit to the subdivision.
*10 In arguing that the trial court's interpretation
was incorrect, Peterson relies on authority inapplicable to the circumstances here. For example, in
contending that this court is required to strictly construe the CC & R's language in his favor and resolve any ambiguities in support of permitting him
to build his home, Peterson relies on decisions governing the interpretation of conditions subsequent
in a deed. (See Sanders v. East Bay Mun. Utility
Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 125; Springmeyer v.
City of South Lake Tahoe (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d
375.)Because a condition subsequent permits a
grantor to "automatically" regain ownership of land
if the condition occurs, the courts have applied a
rule of strict construction based on the disfavored
nature of an automatic termination provision.
{Ibid.) These same concerns do not logically extend
to the interpretation of a building restriction, the violation of which is subject to injunctive relief rather
than an automatic loss of title. (See Ezer v. Fuchsloch, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 861 [rejecting rule
that restrictive covenants will be strictly construed
against persons seeking to enforce them].) We are
similarly unpersuaded by Peterson's argument that
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the court's interpretation is wrong as a matter of law
because it renders his property valueless. For support of this argument, Peterson relies on concepts
from two California Supreme Court decisions, one
of which is contained in the dissenting opinion (see
Hocking v. Title Ins & Trust Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d
644, 655 (dis. opn. of Carter, J.) and the other
which is reflected in the lower court's decision that
was reversed by the high court. ( Landgale, Inc. v.
California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006
[concerning temporary takings doctrine].)
Finally, as he did in opposing the summary judgment, Peterson relies on language in the Corona Estates CC & R's to argue that the provision should be
interpreted to permit him to build on his property.
He argues, for example, that the CC & R's incorporation of local ordinances and resolutions, together
with the grantor's failure to prohibit lot subdivision
and the absence of the phrase "original lot" in Paragraph 3, supports his argument that the contracting
parties intended to permit an additional home to be
built if a lot was legally subdivided. As recognized
in our prior opinion, these aspects of the Corona
Estates CC & R's create a facial ambiguity as to the
meaning of Paragraph 3. But at this stage of the
proceedings our task is to resolve the ambiguity
based on the evidence and arguments presented at
trial. As explained, we have concluded that the language of the Corona Estates CC & R's, when considered with the surrounding circumstances and
purpose of the document, establishes that the original covenanting parties intended to permit only
one home per original lot. Given this conclusion,
the fact that there is language in the CC & R's that
could support a contrary interpretation is not dispositive.
II. The Court Did Not Exceed its Equity Jurisdiction
*11 Peterson next asserts numerous contentions in
an attempt to challenge the court's equity jurisdiction and equitable rulings. In evaluating these contentions, we apply a deferential review standard. A
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trial court has broad discretion in exercising its
equitable powers and in determining whether injunctive relief should be granted and the form of
the relief under the particular facts of the case. (See
Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 394; Smith v. Mendonsa (1952) 108 Cal .App.2d 540. 543; Biagini v.
Hyde (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 877, 880; see also Morgan v. Veach (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 691.)
Peterson first argues the court had no authority to
grant injunctive relief because Ragen had an adequate remedy at law. In support of this argument,
Peterson directs us to Ragen's testimony that
Peterson's proposed home would decrease the value
of Ragen's property by approximately $350,000.
However, the courts have long held that "the legal
remedy of damages is generally inadequate in real
property disputes...." ( Wilkison v. Wiederkehr
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; see also Remmers v. Ciciliot (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 113,
!19-120.)Moreover, as stated by the California Supreme Court in the decision relied upon by
Peterson, " '[e]quitable remedies exist to supply relief where no legal remedy exists, or where the existing legal remedy is inadequate under the circumstances of a particular case.' " ( Pacific Scene, Inc.
v. Pehasquilos, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 407, 412, italics added.) The trial court had sufficient grounds to
find that monetary damages would not provide Ragen with the necessary relief under the circumstances. Ragen testified that Peterson's home would
block his view of the ocean and diminish his privacy, and would interfere with the use and enjoyment of the home in which he had lived for the past
25 years. The court could reasonably find that monetary damages would not adequately compensate
for these losses.
Peterson next argues the court abused its discretion
because the injunction results in a forfeiture of his
property and therefore the enforcement of the CC &
R's is "inequitable," "oppressive" and "unjust" as
applied to him. While we are sympathetic with
Peterson's concerns, the arguments are insufficient
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to show the trial court abused its discretion to decide the appropriateness of the injunction.
Generally, " ' "[forfeitures ... are not favored by
the courts, and are never enforced if they are
couched in ambiguous terms...." ' " ( Sanders v.
East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th
at p. 130.)However, the record shows that Peterson,
an experienced developer, understood the risks of
purchasing the vacant lot in a neighborhood governed by CC & R's, including the possibility that
the lot would not be a buildable site. Peterson had
actual notice of the CC & R's before he purchased
the property and before he incurred the development costs. Although Peterson could have approached the adjacent neighbor (Ragen) to inquire
about the Paragraph 3 issue and/or brought a declaratory relief action seeking to establish his right
to build on the land (Code Civ. Proa, § 1060),
Peterson elected not to take these steps. Under
these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in implicitly finding that the "forfeiture"
was, at least in part, a result of Peterson's own actions and therefore the resulting detriment was not
an appropriate basis for the refusal to enforce the
building restriction. To the extent Peterson reasonably relied on professionals in believing he could
build on the site, his remedy is to seek relief from
these individuals. As the trial court made clear,
there was nothing that Ragen did, or failed to do,
that created Peterson's loss. Thus, the court could
reasonably find it was Peterson and not Ragen who
should bear the consequences of any forfeiture.
*12 Peterson additionally argues that the court abused its discretion in granting equitable relief because Ragen had "unclean hands" given the fact
that there are now two homes on the original Lot 4.
As discussed in our factual summary, before Ragen
purchased his property, the owners of original Lots
3 and 4 agreed to adjust lot lines so that the original
Lot 4 was reduced and the original Lot 3 was expanded. The Lot 3 owner then built a home on Lot
3 that partially sits on a portion of the original Lot
4.
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Based on these circumstances, Peterson argues that
the court should have denied Ragen relief based on
the unclean hands doctrine. However, to bar an action based on this equitable doctrine, the defendant
must establish "inequitable conduct by the plaintiff
in connection with the matter in controversy...." (
Dickson, Carlson & CampMo v. Pole (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 436, 446.)The fact that Ragen did not
complain about the residence on the enlarged Lot 3
does not show the type of inequitable conduct that
would bar the action here. First, the record shows
Ragen purchased his home after the Lot 3 owner
built a home that was located partly on the original
Lot 4 property. The CC & R's specifically state that
"[a]ny building erected on any of said lots which
has been completed shall be deemed to comply with
each and all of the restrictions contained herein...."
Thus, there was no opportunity or grounds for Ragen to object to the CC & R's violation when he
first moved into the neighborhood. Moreover, there
are now a total of two homes on the two original
Lots 3 and 4, which arguably complies with the
spirit-if not the technical wording-of the CC & R's
one-lot/one-residence rule. In contrast, if Peterson
is permitted to build a home, this would result in
three homes on two original lots, creating a material deviation from the Corona Estates CC & R's.
Finally, to the extent Peterson contends the trial
court's statement of decision is deficient because
the court failed to specifically address each of
Peterson's equitable defenses, we reject the contention. The trial court's statement of decision shows
the court considered the substance of all the matters
raised by Peterson. Although the court could have
been more specific as to each equitable argument,
the statement of decision sufficiently disposed of
all the basic issues in the case. (See Code Civ.
Proc. §§ 632, 634.)
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granted Ragen a permanent injunction preventing
Peterson "from building a detached single family
dwelling on [his Corona Estates lot]" and a judicial
declaration "that the CC & Rs prohibit more than
one single family dwelling for each of the original
65 [Corona Estates] subdivision lots...." Peterson
argues that this language was too broad because
Ragen's expert admitted at trial that there are circumstances under which he may be permitted to
build a home on his lot, including: (1) a waiver by
the other Corona Estates lot owners; (2) changed
circumstances that render the CC & R's restrictions
"obsolete"; (3) a finding that the restrictions contravene state or local law; or (4) an amendment to the
CC & R's permitting more than one home per original lot.
*13 However, to the extent any of these circumstances occur, Peterson would be entitled to reassert
his rights in a new action. " ' "It is settled that
where there has been a change in the controlling
facts upon which a permanent injunction was granted, or the law has been changed, modified or extended, or where the ends of justice would be
served by modification or dissolution, the court has
the inherent power to vacate or modify an injunction where the circumstances and situation of the
parties have so changed as to render such action
just and equitable.' " [Citations.]...." ( Mendly v.
County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193,
1207; accord Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior
Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 94-95.)"[A] preventative injunction ... is always subject, upon a proper
showing, to modification or dissolution by the
court...." (Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, 18 Cal.2d at pp. 94-95.)
Given these principles, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that there was no need
to identify the various circumstances under which
the injunction may be modified or vacated.

III. Form of Judgment
Peterson next challenges the form of the judgment
because it does not take into account the possibility
of future changed circumstances. The judgment

DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed. Peterson to bear Ragen's costs
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on appeal.
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE and O'ROURKE, JJ.
Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2004.
Ragen v. Peterson
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d° 2004 WL 385347
(Cal.App. 4 Dist.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Colorado.
CAMP COAST TO COAST, INC., a Delaware corporation, Grand Incentives, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Chicago Title Company, a California corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
WOODBINE INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Wyoming
corporation, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 08-cv-00981-REB.
Nov. 17,2008.
Richard John Capriola, Weinstock & Scavo, P.C.,
Atlanta, GA, Todd Laurence Vriesman, Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP,
Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge.
*1 The matter before me is Plaintiffs' Motion for
Default Judgment [# 29], filed October 16, 2008. I
deny the motion.
This civil action was commenced on May 12, 2008,
by plaintiffs filing of the Verified Complaint [# 1].
The verified complaint avers three substantive
claims for relief: 1) breach of the Distribution and
Fulfillment Agreement; 2) breach of the Escrow
Agreement; and 3) conversion and infringement of
trade secrets.
I have subject matter jurisdiction over this action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship).
Venue is proper in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado under 28 U .S.C. §
1391.
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I granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order following a hearing on May 15, 2008.
(See Temporary Restraining Order [# 13], filed
May 15, 2008.) The TRO was set to expire by its
own terms and in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P.
65(b) at 4:35 p.m. MDT on Friday, May 30, 2008.
(Id. at 4, Tj 8.) A hearing on plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction was scheduled for a hearing
on Friday, May 30, 2008, at 4:00 p.m. (Id. at 4, K
9.) Although defendant was served with a copy of
the TRO (see Return of Service [# 17], filed May
15, 2008), it did not appear by counsel or otherwise. Following that hearing, I entered a Preliminary Injunction [# 24], filed May 30, 2008, enjoining
defendant as follows:
a. Contacting or communicating with any consumer
purchasers ("Participants") in the Coast to Coast
Getaways Club ("Program");
b. Using or disseminating personal information relating to Participants, including but not limited to
Participants' names, addresses, telephone numbers, fax numbers, email addresses, and other
contact information, personal information, and
financial information of Participants ("Participant
Information");
c. Using plaintiff Camp Coast To Coast, Inc.'s
trademarks, including but not limited to the
names "Camp Coast to Coast," "Coast to Coast,"
and the winged "Coast to Coast Est. 1972" logo[.]
(Preliminary Injunction at 3, ^ 2.)
Given defendant's failure to appear or defend in this
action, plaintiffs sought and were granted a Clerk's
Entry of Default [# 27], filed June 9, 2008, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). When the case then appeared to languish, I issued an Order To Show
Cause [# 28], filed October 8, 2008, requiring
plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be
administratively closed or dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Plaintiffs responded to the show cause
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order (Response to Order To Show Cause [#31],
filed October 16, 2008) P N 1 and also filed the
present motion for default judgment pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b).
FN1. The Order To Show Cause was subsequently discharged. (Order Discharging
Order To Show Cause [# 32] filed
November 7, 2008.)
Plaintiffs' motion seeks only a permanent injunction, having determined that "Defendant has apparently closed its offices and ceased to operate as a
going concern, and is unlikely to answer a judgment for monetary damages."(Response to Order
To Show Cause at 1-2.) By virtue of that same
fact, however, plaintiffs cannot establish the type of
ongoing or continuing threat of future harm that undergirds the extraordinary remedy of permanent injunctive relief:
*2 The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future
violations.... [T]he moving party must satisfy the
court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable
danger of recurrent violation, something more
than the mere possibility which serves to keep the
case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on
all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily
broad and a strong showing of abuse must be
made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona
fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some
cases, the character of the past violations.
Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633,
73 S.Ct. 894, 898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)).&* also
Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
185 F.R.D. 324, 349-50 (D.Kan. 1999) (noting that
"mere proof of a past violation does not justify injunctive relief because an injunction is only available to prevent continuing or future harm") (citing
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343
U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 695, 96 L.Ed. 978
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(1952)). If there is no proof of future violations, the
movant lacks standing to seek a permanent injunction. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660,1667, 75 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96,
94 S.Ct. 669, 676, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)); Buchwald v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 159 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir.1998).
The mere fact of defendant's default per se does not
entitle plaintiffs ipso facto to the entry of permanent injunctive relief. "An injunction is a matter of
equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course." Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008 WL
4862464 at *16 (November 12, 2008); see also
Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466,
468 (10th Cir.1992), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 830,
114 S.Ct. 98, 126 L.Ed.2d 65 (1993). Plaintiffs
have produced no evidence suggesting that there is
any danger of future communications between defendant and plaintiffs' participants of the kind that
precipitated this lawsuit. Indeed, it appears that defendant has ceased operations all together. It is difficult to imagine that defendant could pose a continuing threat of future violations under those circumstances.
Thus, it appears that at this juncture, this lawsuit
has accomplished by operation of time and circumstance plaintiffs' original purpose. The entry of a
permanent injunction is not warranted on the facts
presented. The motion for default judgment must be
denied. Moreover, given the circumstances, I find
and conclude that the matter should be administratively closed as provided by the Local Rules of this
district, subject to reopening for good cause shown.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment
[# 29], filed October 16, 2008, is DENIED; and
*3 2. That the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to
administratively close this matter pursuant to
D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to reopening for
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good cause shown.
D.Colo.,2008.
Camp Coast To Coast, Inc. v. Woodbine Investments, LLC
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4936205 (D.Colo.)
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